The future of SEA accountability lies not in designing new mechanisms but in ensuring existing systems work across the bureaucratic, institutional and operational realities.

BY: EMMACULATE A. LIAGA

The 19th of June was commemorated as the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict. Rightly, our attention focuses on armed actors who use sexual violence as a weapon of war. However, another challenge that continues to confront conflict areas: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) in peace operations missions. This refers to both acts and threats of sexual exploitation and abuse arising from power asymmetries, dependency and vulnerability, committed by those deployed to protect vulnerable populations.

To address this, UN and AU accountability mechanisms and frameworks have become increasingly institutionalised. however, evolving peace operation models and evironment are creating and widening accountability gaps that these existing frameworks were not designed to address.

SEA remains a major threat to the legitimacy of peace operations. Allegations have risen, with UN reports noting increases in UN peacekeeping and political missions, 75 allegations in 2021, up from 66 in 2020 and 79 in 2022. In 2024, 102 SEA allegations involved 125 victims, mainly in UNMISS and MINUSCA, making up 82% of reports. Similar issues arose in AU-led Peace Support Operations, such as in Somalia, prompting reforms in accountability.

But peace operations do not operate in isolation. Humanitarian organisations, implementing partners, contractors, and international actors working in communities. Recent claims against aid workers supporting Sudanese refugees in Chad exposed exploitation based on dependency, unequal power, and fear of retaliation.

The UN has two decades of developing its extensive accountability architecture anchored in the Secretary-General's Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, the Conduct and Discipline Framework, Conduct and Discipline Units in peace operations, the ClearCheck screening database, community-based complaint mechanisms, victim assistance programmes, mandatory pre-deployment and in-mission training, and system-wide reporting and case-tracking mechanisms.

The AU, on its part, built its systematic and institutionalised AU compliance and accountability mechanisms in 2017; earlier peace support operations relied on mission-specific accountability arrangements. The AU frameworks have included the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCAF) for PSOs, emphasising Prevention and Response to SEA. The AU developed policies on Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Conduct and Discipline, and personnel screening. AU officials also recognised that a draft Report and Complaint Mechanisms Guidelines for PSOs is also in development, offering guidance on effective, accessible, and credible reporting systems. The AU plans to review existing accountability mechanisms with the Mission to identify areas for improvement.

Importantly, at the mission level, SEA allegations are met with a strong operational commitment to prevent SEA. The strongest enforcement measures have included ‘zero tolerance’ (adopted by both the AU and the UN) for SEA and enforced through operational sanctions. For instance, in 2023, an entire contingent in MONUSCO was repatriated, while in 2018, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan recalled a unit of police officers from Wau. In Somalia, AU officials reported the formation of a Board of Inquiry (BOI) to oversee allegations that have been reported over the years.

Both UN and AU measures reflect a broader shift from ad hoc responses towards institutionalised prevention, enforcement, and victim-centred accountability, gravitating more towards partnership models. Both their Prevention and Response to SEA framework adopts a three-step pillar approach of implementation: i) prevention (through screening, training and awareness), ii) response (through reporting, investigations and disciplinary procedures) and iii) remedial action (through victim assistance, case management and follow-up mechanisms).

The weaknesses that threaten future SEA accountability are already evident in current missions and offer an opportunity for corrective action before they become systemic problems. Three main opportunities for reflection present themselves.

First, accountability increasingly relies on multiple actors. This complexity of missions requires consistent application of standards across various legal, institutional, and operational arrangements, highlighting the growing need for clearer accountability coordination.

For instance, before deploying UN peacekeeping operations, the UN applies its Status of Forces Agreements, Memoranda of Understanding, and conduct-and-discipline provisions to clarify responsibilities. Increasingly, during missions, new contributors, support arrangements, and partnership models emerge, making it more challenging for all actors to understand and fulfil their accountability obligations.

Somalia illustrates this development. The SEA accountability framework supporting AUSSOM comprises a network of actors, including AU compliance bodies, troop- and police-contributing nations, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), national agencies, the Somalia Inter-Agency Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) Network, and external providers that support victims. These structures have the potential to enhance prevention, reporting, and survivor-Centred Accountability, but their success depends on cross-institutional coordination to ensure accountability. While allegations are to be reported through the AUSSOM accountability structures, investigations are conducted by another mechanism and eventually require intervention by national authorities from the T/PCC. Delays in sharing information, case referrals, or follow-up can hinder tracking accountability outcomes, especially when multiple actors share responsibility. The key challenge is not the lack of accountability mechanisms but maintaining their continuity and oversight in a coordinated manner as cases transition between institutions.

This raises difficult questions. Who retains responsibility for ongoing investigations? Who maintains case records? How are survivors supported across institutional transitions? While transitions do not necessarily create accountability failures, they create additional points where delays, communication gaps and fragmented responsibilities can affect case management and follow-up.

Coalition-based operations layer additional complexity. The MNJTF brings together contingents operating under different legal systems, disciplinary procedures and military justice frameworks. While MNJTF is mainstreaming SEA, the force operates under a common mandate and command structure (The headquarters and Force Commander are responsible for operational oversight and the implementation of common standards), while accountability responsibilities remain distributed across several actors (while troop-contributing countries retain primary responsibility for investigating, disciplining and prosecuting their personnel under national law.) The AU and the Lake Chad Basin Commission provide additional oversight through the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework.

The implementation challenges often fall along their operational command structures. For instance, while participating states may share common operational objectives, accountability is often managed at the national level. Thus, a Cameroonian troop operating in Nigerian territory will face the victim in Nigeria but will be subject to Cameroon's military justice system, which often faces delays due to jurisdictional complexities and investigations dependent on national systems. Thus, cross-border operations complicate accountability, without clarity on who ensures continuity when accountability responsibilities are dispersed across several sovereign jurisdictions.

MNJTF’s multinational, coalition-based, and cross-border approach led to the 2017 UN recognition of the need for common standards on SEA. As these models become more widespread, it will be increasingly important to ensure consistent enforcement of SEA standards across national contingents, legal systems, and accountability mechanisms.

Second, while accountability is improving, follow-up with member states remains the weakest link and is harder to track beyond institutional boundaries.

Typically, missions receive allegations, document cases, and initiate administrative action. While the UN has the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which investigates allegations involving UN personnel and conducts administrative investigations, the AU has the Board of Investigations.

Accountability outcomes often depend on institutions beyond the mission itself. In both the UN and the AU, criminal investigations, prosecutions and sanctions remain the responsibility of troop- and police-contributing countries. Both institutions have related Memoranda of Understanding with troop- and police-contributing countries, which recognise that member states retain primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting misconduct by their deployed personnel.

This division of responsibility is legally necessary but operationally difficult. Reportedly, OIOS found that response rates and follow-up by troop-contributing countries had been a longstanding concern, including delays in deploying National Investigation Officers, and they face general resistance and a lack of cooperation from some national authorities. Even where allegations are reported and administrative processes initiated, investigations can lose momentum if investigators arrive late, evidence deteriorates, or national follow-up is delayed. Making justice hard to achieve and sometimes, inaccessible.

Similar issues impact the implementation of AU mechanisms. Both the AU Screening and Case Management System rely on timely updates from member states regarding investigations, disciplinary measures, and judicial outcomes involving deployed personnel. Delays or gaps make it difficult to assess eligibility for future deployments or track accountability. An attempt to address this is the AU-drafted Communications and Feedback Guidelines, which aim to improve information sharing and follow-up with Member States.

However, the challenge is not only whether member states are willing to report, but troop- and police-contributing countries also do not have the same domestic frameworks, investigative capabilities, military justice systems or legal provisions governing offences committed during overseas deployments. As a result, accountability outcomes can vary considerably across missions and contributing countries.

In the absence of stronger, more standardised reporting obligations and enforceable measures, the effectiveness of this framework will largely depend on Member States' willingness to comply with its provisions and uphold their accountability obligations.

A third challenge is that accountability begins with trust, not investigations.

Reporting remains one of the weakest points in the accountability chain. Experiences indicate that reporting mechanisms often exist but remain underutilised because communities do not fully trust them. Fear of retaliation, stigma, concerns over confidentiality, Access to remedies, Reparations, Long-term victim support, Psychological services, Barriers faced by survivors during investigations, and doubts that complaints will lead to meaningful action can discourage reporting. Challenges have been documented in the Central African Republic, where survivors have sometimes avoided formal reporting due to economic dependency, mistrust of institutions or uncertainty about outcomes. The growing use of Community-Based Complaint Mechanisms (CBCMs) in UN country -level PSEA reflects recognition that accountability begins long before an investigation is launched. Effective accountability depends on trusted reporting pathways that communities perceive as safe, accessible and capable of delivering justice. Without that trust, allegations remain hidden, and accountability mechanisms cannot function.

Experience points to a related challenge. In contexts marked by displacement, poverty and economic vulnerability, some victims choose informal settlements or financial compensation rather than engaging with lengthy accountability processes whose outcomes remain uncertain. Others disengage from investigations altogether.

These experiences suggest that the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms depends not only on their existence, but on whether affected communities perceive them as accessible, credible and capable of delivering meaningful outcomes.

Contemporary peace operations already operate through complex networks of actors instead of single chains of command. As accountability duties spread across these networks, the main risk is not a lack of accountability but fragmentation. In such cases, information and responsibilities shift quickly across institutions, jurisdictions, and reporting systems, often moving faster than the accountability mechanisms can coordinate effectively. The way forward is stronger interoperability in the accountability systems, including mission ↔ T/PCC ↔ host state ↔ community reporting networks ↔ humanitarian actors ↔ victim support providers ↔ headquarters databases.

This commitment is also reflected in the Joint AU–UN Roadmap for implementing UNSCR 2719, which recognises that the future challenge lies in governing complex, multi-actor peace operations. The inclusion of a dedicated Transitions Guideline in the UNSCR 2719 roadmap, together with the experiences of the Joint Task Team, reflects recognition that transitions are a strategic governance challenge, thereby highlighting that future implementation challenges increasingly arise at interfaces between institutions rather than within individual institutions. Significantly, the joint AU–UN Roadmap places considerable importance on joint planning, information sharing, reporting, transition management, and compliance readiness as key elements for future AU-led peace support operations.

This points to the importance of the recent UN and AU Tenth African Union–United Nations Annual Conference on 13 May 2026, where the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) Secretary General reaffirmed their commitment to improving accountability and adherence to human rights, including SEA, in peace support missions.

Future reforms should therefore focus on strengthening interoperability through compatible vetting systems, shared case-tracking mechanisms, harmonised reporting standards, coordinated survivor-referral pathways, and clear accountability protocols for mission transitions. Joint training and planning should also integrate accountability considerations from the outset, rather than treating them as stand-alone compliance requirements.