Celebrating 30 years of the Training for Peace programme

Building capacity for the protection of civilians in African-led Peace Support Operations:

AU–UN cooperation beyond United Nations Security Council resolution 2719



By
Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie and
Julie Askeland Caspersen

ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AES	Alliance of Sahel States *(Alliance des États du Sahel)*
AFISM-CAR	African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
ASI	ad hoc security initiative
ASWJ	Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
AU-MVCM	African Union Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mechanism
AUC	African Union Commission
AUCAF	African Union Compliance and Accountability Framework
AUSSOM	African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia
AUTSTG	African Union Technical Support Team to The Gambia
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCTARC	Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CIMIC	civil–military cooperation
CITAC	Civilian Casualty Identification, Tracking and Analysis Cell
CIVIC	Center for Civilians in Conflict
CONOPS	concept of operations
CSO	civil society organisation
DDR	disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DDRRR	disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSSR	defence and security sector reform
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMIB	ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMIG	ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States

ESA	enterprise security arrangement
EU	European Union
FADM	Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo *(Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo)*
FC-G5S	G5 Sahel Joint Force *(Force conjointe du G5 Sahel)*
FRAGO	fragmentary order
G5 Sahel	Group of Five for the Sahel
GAF	Gambia Armed Forces
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HRDDP	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL	international humanitarian law
IHRL	international human rights law
JCM	Joint Coordination Mechanism
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MICEMA	ECOWAS Mission in Mali
MICOPAX	ECCAS Peace Consolidation Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISAHEL	African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel
MISCA	African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic
MISSANG	Angolan Mission of Support to Reform in the Defence and Security Sector
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MoU	memorandum of understanding
MSU	Mediation Support Unit
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
OPLAN	operational plan
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PE	peace enforcement
PKO	peacekeeping operation
POC	protection of civilians
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	peace support operation
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division

R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCI-LRA	Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army
RDF	Rwanda Defence Force
REC	regional economic community
RM	regional mechanism
RNP	Rwanda National Police
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RS-SRR	Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience
RSS	Regional Stabilisation Strategy
RTF	Regional Task Force
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAMIDRC	SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
SAMIM	SADC Mission in Mozambique
SAPMIL	SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho
SEA	sexual exploitation and abuse
SG	Secretary-General
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPM	special political mission
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	security sector reform
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UN TF	United Nations Task Force
UNAMID	African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
UPDF	Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces
US	United States
USD	United States dollar

INTRODUCTION

The international system is undergoing profound transformation as geopolitical competition, shifting power dynamics and complex security risks reshape global governance. An increasingly fragmented global multilateral system has, in turn, created significant challenges for responses to conflict, humanitarian crises, climate change and transnational security threats. More and more, regional organisations are expected to fill the gaps and maintain peace and security. In this context, the partnership between the African Union (AU) — Africa's principal multilateral institution — and the United Nations (UN) has become a particularly prominent pillar of multilateral cooperation.[1] Collaboration between the two institutions provides a framework for African-led solutions to be supported by global institutions in addressing the continent's evolving peace, security and development priorities.[2]

Over the past decade, cooperation between the two entities has expanded through various institutional instruments, political dialogue and joint action across peace and security, governance, human rights and sustainable development.[3] Guided by the Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, and aligned with the AU's Agenda 2063 and the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the partnership has become a strategic mechanism for conflict prevention, mediation, peace support operations (PSOs) and post-conflict recovery.[4] Along with the AU–UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2018), the aforementioned instruments establish a strategic partnership that explicitly links peace and security with sustainable development and institutional cooperation.

The outcomes of the ninth and tenth AU-UN Annual Conferences in 2025 and 2026 reaffirmed the shared commitments of both organisations to strengthen coordination and accelerate joint priorities. These include the implementation of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2719 on financing African-led PSOs. The implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) in Somalia also highlights the importance of integrating human rights safeguards into UN support for African-led PSOs.

Despite significant advancements, the AU-UN partnership operates within an increasingly demanding security and financial environment.[5] Protracted conflicts in Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, for instance, continue to test regional and international peace efforts. Similarly, terrorism, violent extremism, humanitarian crises and climate-related security risks place additional pressure on both national and regional institutions. At the same time, the implementation of UNSCR 2719 currently appears to be aspirational. It does, however, present new opportunities to strengthen African-led PSOs through more predictable and sustainable financing.

These challenges call for a more integrated response to emerging security threats. Specifically, closer cooperation is required between the AU and the UN, as well as with the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs), on issues such as civilians, child protection, human rights due diligence and border security. The RECs/RMs are critical in Africa's integration and essential components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).[6]

Over the last decade, peacekeeping has been one of few areas to see significant joint AU and UN efforts. Significant themes have included coordination,[7] the identities of agents and their normative difficulties,[8] lessons from hybrid

peace operations,[9] the evolving nature of AU peace operations,[10] challenges between the two entities[11] and competition over leadership.[12] The AU-UN relationship is often analysed through the lens of technical difficulties experienced in PSOs. Less attention has been given to how their partnership dynamics relate to the broader normative struggles of peacekeeping.[13,14]

UNSCR 2719, adopted 21 December 2023, directs the AU and UN to dedicate substantial resources to the delivery of several key tasks. These include a financing framework to provide predictable, adequate and sustainable financing for eligible AU-led missions. The creation of four workstreams to implement the resolution arose from a decision by the AU and UN principals to set up a joint task force, with directives to work together and provide practical options for operationalising the resolution. In May 2024, the UN team visited the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, leading to the creation of a joint roadmap for actualizing the resolution. The workstreams that emerged are as follows:

1. Planning, decision-making, and reporting. This workstream establishes joint planning modalities, common reference frameworks and streamlined reporting architectures for authorising future AU-led PSOs.
2. Mission support. The second workstream focuses on operational support guidelines, building logistical synergies and ensuring field efficiency for deployed missions.
3. Financing and budgeting. The third workstream identifies mechanisms to manage, allocate and oversee the hybrid funding model, where up to 75 percent of the budget comes from UN-assessed contributions.
4. Human rights compliance and the protection of civilians (POC). The fourth workstream centres on ensuring that all missions adhere strictly to international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights standards and protection mandates.

The fourth area aligns with the objective of the resolution to enhance POC and promote compliance with IHL, international human rights law (IHRL) and International Refugee Law — with an emphasis on the AU Compliance Framework on IHL, the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCAF) and the UN HRDDP where UN support is provided. The resolution also strengthens accountability and oversight. It includes reporting requirements from the offices of both the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission on progress in the implementation of UNSCR 2719, operational performance, compliance with applicable frameworks, financial management and lessons learned.[15]

Towards a deeper understanding of POC in African-led peace operations

Attaining the objectives of UNSCR 2719 requires AU-led missions to explicitly prioritise POC. The aim of this report is to deepen the current discourse on POC in African-led PSOs, especially those supported by the UN and AU, focusing on how support has been provided and executed in contemporary contexts. It is one of two reports specifically focused on the fourth UNSCR 2719 workstream. AU-led missions are frequently deployed in active combat zones or during peace enforcement operations (such as counterterrorism operations), where they support a host government against armed groups. Understanding these contexts is thus critical; also for anticipating challenges that future AU-led missions may encounter.

As mentioned, RECs/RMs are integral to the implementation of the APSA, while ad hoc security initiatives (ASIs) and enterprise security arrangements (ESAs) constitute an emerging tool used by various African states. The report closely examines existing collaborations between the AU and UN with RECs/RMs, ASIs and ESAs on matters relating to POC and protection more broadly. It also aims to inform how human rights compliance and POC should be understood in the context of a mission that starts off under the leadership of a REC or as an ASI or ESA, but which is later re-hatted as an AU-led PSO or potentially receive support from the UN.

The report is structured in seven parts. The first section explores the research methods and tools used to build the analysis. The second section provides a critical overview of contemporary African-led PSOs, and the lessons they offer for understanding how POC could be better configured in future missions. The third section focuses on the AU–UN partnership, examining its history as well as the current dynamics that shape relations between the two organisations.

The fourth section centres specifically on the AU mission in Somalia. It examines the objectives of the mission and considers the broader support mechanisms that have been put in place, with a focus on the HRDDP. The fifth section unpacks the partnership between the AU and the RECs, assessing the critical elements that shape this relationship and how they have evolved since the formation of the AU in 2002. The sixth section examines POC support in missions led by the AU and UN; REC-led PSOs; as well as ASIs and ESAs. The final section concludes with a series of succinct recommendations.

RESEARCH METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

The report draws on the concept of African-led PSOs advanced by scholars such as Paul Williams in his generational focus on peacekeeping (2015) and Cedric de Coning's research on doctrinal differences between the UN and AU (2017). It applies Tchie's framing of African-led PSOs to select cases across REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs (2024). Within this framework, the report draws on examples where publicly available data, standard operating procedures (SOPs), concept of operations (CONOPS) and other mission-related documents are readily available. The report analysed data from 13 such cases: six REC-led PSOs, three ASIs and four ESAs.[16] Each mission was scored across three pillars: AU support, UN support and POC implementation. In doing so, the report aimed not to critique the AU-UN relationship but rather to understand how the two organisations have been working with African entities such as the RECs/RMs, ASIs and ESAs and continue to support conditions towards peace.

Additionally, the report applied two research methods. The first was qualitative data gathering and analysis, which included an extensive desk review of academic literature, policy research and internal and external meetings and documents of both the AU and UN, such as communiqués. This was followed by actor mapping: compiling a comprehensive list of experts, civil society organisations (CSOs) and government officials to engage with across key ministries and institutions. Next, online interviews were conducted with AU and UN respondents, focusing on POC and human rights matters across their missions as well as their work with RECs, ASIs and ESAs. The interview process, through the snowballing approach, built on the mapping process and led to in-depth online interviews using Teams, Zoom and in some cases WhatsApp (due to connectivity issues). Interviews lasted between 45 and 55 minutes. Respondents were fully informed of the aims of the study and provided with an opportunity to opt out. This allowed for deep and candid discussion.

The second research method was a structured database that draws on key mission documentation, later coded into numeric scores for comparison across cases. First, data and information were collected from concepts of operations (CONOPS), which set out how a mission will achieve its mandate. (For example, the AU mission in Somalia CONOPS sets out how the mission will support the Somali Security Forces, how military and police components will operate, how civilians will be protected, how human rights compliance will be ensured and how responsibilities will gradually transition to Somali institutions.) The data also drew on standard operating procedures (SOPs), which describe how specific tasks should be performed consistently across a mission. In some cases, all CONOPs and SOPs were made available to the authors, while in others these data points were not obtainable and interviews with mission staff were required. Where available, missions' POC strategies were requested, analysed. The authors also examined operational plans (OPLANs), which detail operational tasks, timelines and resources, as well as fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), where available, which update and modify operations.

Next, the qualitative and documentation data was coded into a structured scoring database that covered the 13 cases and enabled comparative analysis. Each pillar — namely AU support, UN support and POC implementation — was divided into five sub-dimensions and scored on a scale of zero to three (maximum 15 per pillar). The five AU support sub-dimensions

are political authorisation, operational support, financial/logistical support, AUCAF/compliance and monitoring. The UN support sub-dimensions are political accompaniment, human rights monitoring, humanitarian coordination, capacity building and financial support. The five sub-dimensions for POC implementation are formal mandate, active protection, deterrence through presence, harm tracking and civil-military coordination (CIMIC).

These AU and UN sub-dimensions were selected because authorisation and political accompaniment determine whether support toward a mission can be expected, while operational, financial and logistical support (toward POC) shows what is actually provided for the missions. Monitoring, compliance and humanitarian coordination indicate the oversight mechanisms in place and whether civilian harm is tracked and addressed. The POC scoring follows the AU's four-pillar POC framework (protection through political process, physical protection, rights-based protection and the establishment of a protective environment) and the UN's three-tier framework (dialogue and engagement, physical protection and a protective environment).[17]

Rather than applying a single universal rubric, each of the 15 sub-dimensions was assigned its own specific scoring criteria, reflecting what that particular form of support or implementation looks like in practice. This is because AU political authorisation, for example, is not comparable in kind to UN financial support or mission-level harm tracking. Scores were assigned using the full range of source material described above, including CONOPS, SOPs, OPLANs, FRAGOs and POC strategies, as well as AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) communiqués, UNSCRs, reports of the Secretary-General and secondary literature. Borderline and contested scores were flagged and reviewed for consistency across comparable cases before being finalised.

The scoring exercise was subject to significant limitations. First, since coding relied on publicly available documentation, the database likely undercounts engagement that occurred but which was not recorded in accessible sources. As the availability, access and quality of information varied across missions and operations, the accuracy of the resulting scoring may similarly vary. Second, the dataset should be regarded as a cross-sectional snapshot, rather than a longitudinal database. It does not control for variables such as mission duration, the maturity of the AU or UN normative architecture at the time of operation, or the intensity of the conflict environment. The analysis should therefore be understood as identifying correlations and patterns of association between institutional support and POC implementation, and not as causal structures. The database maps the architecture of AU and UN engagement across a range of REC-led PSOs, ESAs and ASIs. It does not establish that a particular level of support produced a particular protection outcome.

Emerging trends from wider African-led PSOs

The AU and UN have been working closely over the last three years to operationalise, advance and report on progress in implementing UNSCR 2719. However, several critical factors are frequently overlooked. First is that neither the AU nor the UN have deployed any new, large-scale peacekeeping mission in Africa, either jointly or separately, since 2013.

The UN has deployed several special political missions (SPMs), for instance to Sudan, and the

AU has deployed the AU Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mechanism (AU-MVCM) in Tigray, Ethiopia. However, there have not been any new, large-scale missions outside of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which transitioned in 2022 into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and subsequently handed over responsibilities to the successor African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) on 1 January 2025.

Table 1: Missions in Africa that have transitioned over the last 25 years

Original mission	Lead organisation	Country	Successor or follow-on mission	Successor organisation	Transition date	Transition pathway
Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	Liberia	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	United Nations (UN)	19 September 2003	ECOWAS → UN follow-on mission
ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)	ECOWAS	Côte d'Ivoire	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	UN	4 April 2004	ECOWAS → UN follow-on mission
ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA)	ECOWAS	Mali	African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)	African Union (AU)	2013	ECOWAS → AU-led mission
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)	AU	Burundi	United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	UN	1 May 2004	AU → UN mission
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	AU	Sudan/ Darfur	African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	AU–UN	31 December 2007	AU → AU–UN hybrid mission
AFISMA	AU/ECOWAS-led	Mali	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	UN	1 July 2013	African-led → UN mission
African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA)	AU	Central African Republic	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	UN	15 September 2014	AU → UN mission
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	AU	Somalia	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)	AU	1 April 2022	AU mission → AU successor mission
ATMIS	AU	Somalia	African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)	AU	1 January 2025	AU mission → AU successor mission

Source: Authors' own

Over the past two-and-a-half decades, several AU missions have transitioned to UN missions, while REC-led missions have transitioned to the AU. In Somalia, one AU mission transitioned into a new AU mission. This suggests an overlooked trend: rather than involving new, large-scale PKOs, missions are often re-hatted or replaced by follow-on missions, including SPMs. Key lessons can be drawn from their experience.

Second, operational experience does not reside solely with the AU and UN. Conflict on the African continent is increasingly being addressed through an array of newer instruments used by the RECs/RMs, ASIs, and ESA, rather than through AU peacekeeping and AU PSOs alone. It is important to understand how these missions carry out operations, and what lessons they might provide for future deployments financed under UNSCR 2719, especially where an operation transitions first into an AU mission and subsequently a UN mission.[18]

Third, the experience of ASIs is particularly instructive. The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S), for example, faced significant scrutiny over alleged violations of human rights and IHL during counterterrorism operations in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.[19] These included allegations of extrajudicial killings, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and the unlawful confiscation of goods.[20] In response, the coalition — with backing from the European Union (EU) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) — established a compliance framework to track and prevent civilian harm and strengthen accountability.[21] The framework drew on lessons from the early experience with AMISOM.

Over time, and despite the eventual dissolution of the FC-G5S, the force began to improve its relations with affected communities. These included contingents from Chad, which had previously been criticised for an aggressive approach to counter-terrorism. Although critics have rightly highlighted the violence used by some of these forces, disengagement alone will not reduce indiscriminate violence. The experiences of AMISOM and FC-G5S demonstrate that practice can change over time through sustained engagement and oversight.

Recent discussion and efforts have focused heavily on UNSCR 2719.[22] However, RECs/RMs, ASIs and ESAs are accumulating operational experience that can offer important lessons about responding to Africa's evolving and complex conflict landscape. A recently released report of the UN Secretary-General[23] on the review of peacekeeping detailed 15 priorities and 47 recommendations, but offers limited direction on how the AU and UN should move forward together. This question is especially important given that a new Secretary-General will take office in 2027, and may not prioritise the call to reset UN peace operations. Although the review reinforces the centrality of African regional actors and proposes mechanisms that could reshape peacekeeping on the continent, it lacks the depth and innovation of the 2015 report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO). The latter led the AU to issue a follow-up report outlining priorities for advancing its recommendations.

It is therefore important to understand how other African-led PSOs — beyond those led by the UN and AU — are responding to POC and broader protection in their respective contexts. Their operational experience can help practitioners, policymakers and scholars anticipate how a future AU-led mission operating under UNSCR 2719 might navigate protection-related challenges. This includes situations where an existing mission transitions into an AU-led PSO that subsequently seeks financing through UN-assessed contributions or other support authorised by the UN Security Council. The next section critically examines the evolution of the AU-UN partnership and reflects on the current state.

UNDERSTANDING THE AU-UN PARTNERSHIP

By the early 1990s, the UN had become the central peace and security actor in Africa and the leading provider of peacekeeping capacity. By the late 2000s, however, this model had become increasingly unsustainable. As conflicts shifted from interstate wars to intrastate conflicts during the late 1990s, traditional PKOs — designed to monitor ceasefires and protect civilians — became increasingly ill-suited to the emerging security challenges facing the continent.[24] The failures associated with the United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II (UNOSOM I and II), together with the failure of the UN to prevent the Rwandan genocide, deepened scepticism and damaged the organisation's credibility in Africa.[25] Managing these conflicts required a more "proactive and strategic use of force, rather than the static, defensive, and tactical posture of traditional peacekeeping",[26] which lay beyond the scope of prevailing UN doctrine. Recognising these limitations, the UN sought to strengthen its peace and security cooperation with the AU, notably through PSOs and peace enforcement (PE) missions.[27]

Cooperation between the AU and UN has consequently evolved over the past two decades. This has resulted in a realignment intended to strengthen the AU's capacity to deploy PSOs and PE missions beyond the UN's traditional peacekeeping role.[28] One important milestone was the establishment of the 2008 AU–UN Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations, commonly known as the Prodi Panel.[29] The resulting Prodi Report helped lay the groundwork for the subsequent HIPPO report.[30] Efforts to strengthen the partnership continued with an April 2010 report submitted by then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the United Nations General Assembly.[31] Following the Secretary-General's proposal in document A/64/762, the General Assembly approved financing for the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) through resolution 64/288 of 24 June 2010. Established later that year, UNOAU became an important mechanism for strengthening the AU–UN relationship.[32]

In 2017, the AU and UN signed the Joint UN–AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. The agreement recognised that a strong partnership between the two organisations is essential to achieving strategic convergence, coherence and practical responses to Africa's complex peace and security challenges. Despite the commitment demonstrated by the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, gaps remain between AU and UN field missions in collaboration, strategic planning, joint prioritisation and oversight.

The framework guides cooperation in six areas: annual joint consultative meetings between members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU PSC; meetings of the AU–UN Joint Task Force, including senior-level meetings, director-level videoconferences and desk-to-desk exchanges; cooperation on mediation; electoral assistance; PSOs; and Silencing the Guns in Africa. Under the UN Charter, the UNSC retains primary responsibility for international peace and security, while Chapter VIII encourages regional organisations such as the AU to play a role in regional conflict prevention and management. Operating within this framework, the AU regards itself as the principal peace and security decisionmaker on the continent, although the UNSC retains ultimate legal authority. This evolving role has enabled the AU to become a prominent peace and security actor in Africa, altering its position vis-à-vis the UN and strengthening its institutional

capacity in preventive diplomacy, force deployment, early-warning mechanisms and post-conflict reconstruction.[33]

Over the past two decades, engagement between the senior leadership of the two organisations has led to the creation of several institutional arrangements. Some have functioned consistently, while others have been implemented irregularly and on an ad hoc basis. Cooperation has traditionally focused on peacekeeping and PSOs, but has also extended to peacebuilding, post-conflict recovery, early warning and conflict prevention. One important mechanism under the 2017 framework has been the AU–UN desk-to-desk meetings, which initially facilitated regular, direct engagement between corresponding departments and technical experts. Over time, however, engagement at the technical level has declined.[34]

Another consistent mechanism has been the annual AU–UN Conference,[35] during which the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) meet to discuss a broad range of issues, often culminating in a joint statement.[36] More recently, UNSCR 2719 (2023) has prompted the two organisations to formalise structures to support the implementation of the resolution. These include a Joint Task Force and specialised technical groups established to coordinate work on the possible deployment of AU-led PSOs authorised by the UNSC. Areas of collaboration include POC and human rights compliance, joint assessment and planning, financing and logistical support.

This section has shown that, as conflicts shifted from interstate wars to intrastate conflicts, traditional UN peacekeeping — focused on monitoring ceasefires and protecting civilians — became increasingly unable to address complex and violent security threats. Its central argument is that neither the UN nor the AU can effectively respond to Africa's contemporary peace and security challenges alone. The AU has become an increasingly important peace and security actor, while the UN has moved towards supporting the organisation's capacity to conduct PSOs. Nevertheless, the partnership continues to evolve. Its effectiveness depends not only on formal agreements but also on consistent coordination, shared strategic thinking, adequate financing and effective cooperation at the operational level. The next section examines the AU–UN partnership at the mission and country levels through the experience of Somalia.

THE AU MISSION IN SOMALIA AND UN HRDDP

In 2009, the UNSC established the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), creating a framework through which the UN could provide logistical support to AMISOM using UN-assessed contributions. UNSOA was replaced in 2015 by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which progressively adapted its support to the AU's evolving operational requirements. This included support for joint and coordinated operations with the Somali Security Forces, subject to compliance with the UN HRDDP.

The UN Secretary-General introduced the HRDDP in 2011 and instructed all UN entities providing or considering providing support to non-UN security forces to comply with it. The policy sets out the due-diligence measures that UN entities are expected to take within their respective mandates. Its purpose is to ensure that the support they provide to non-UN security forces is consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and with the organisation's responsibility to respect and promote international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.[37] On 25 February 2013, the Secretary-General transmitted the policy to the presidents of the UN General Assembly and the UNSC through identical letters.

The HRDDP builds on existing standards and obligations accepted by states through their membership of the UN, their recognition of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and their ratification of key international instruments. These include the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977; the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

The evolution of the AU–UN partnership

Over the past two decades, the AU and UN have developed a partnership rooted in the principles of complementarity, mutual respect and African ownership. This partnership has become a cornerstone of multilateral engagement in African peace and security. A 2006 declaration helped lay the groundwork for subsequent agreements, including the 2017 Joint UN–AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, the AU–UN Joint Framework on Human Rights and the AU–UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063. These agreements recognised the need for the two institutions to work together in addressing Africa's peace and security challenges.

Developments in Somalia reflected the evolution of this partnership. The AU deployed AMISOM in 2007 to support Somalia's Transitional Federal Government and protect the country's transitional federal institutions, including its parliament. The mission also sought to create a more secure environment for Somali civilians. From 2009, UNSOA provided logistical support to AMISOM. Responsibility for ensuring UN-wide implementation of the HRDDP in Somalia subsequently rested with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

To support implementation of the HRDDP, the UN established a task force and working group comprising relevant UN entities, agencies, funds and programmes. The SRSG for Somalia holds overall responsibility for UN-wide implementation of the policy. Requests for support are referred

by UNSOS to the SRSG, who determines — together with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) and the Chief of the Human Rights and Protection Group — whether a risk assessment by the HRDDP task force is required.

These arrangements informed the development of the Somalia HRDDP standard operating procedure (SOP), which operationalised the mandatory UN-wide policy. The SOP seeks to ensure that support provided by UN entities, including UNSOS and UNSOM, to non-UN security forces complies with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. It has three principal objectives: to guide and strengthen compliance with the HRDDP; to develop and implement mitigation measures, including measures relating to capacity-building and the investigation and reporting of violations; and to engage relevant authorities in investigating reported violations, securing remedial action and preventing their recurrence.

Although AMISOM faced considerable challenges in implementing its compliance framework, it established a dedicated Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC). The cell recorded harm arising from AMISOM operations, including civilian deaths and injuries, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and damage to property and livestock. The AU had also been developing its approach to POC since 2009. Draft AU POC Guidelines were issued in 2010 and ultimately approved in 2023.[38] Similarly, AMISOM developed its Indirect Fire Policy in 2010 in response to concerns about civilian casualties. The policy was endorsed in 2011 and incorporated into the mission's revised Rules of Engagement in 2012.[39]

Where an assessment identifies a risk of grave violations, the UN entity concerned can work with the relevant authorities to establish measures to eliminate or minimise that risk. Such measures are determined on a case-by-case basis. In a resolution concerning AMISOM, the UNSC welcomed the work of CCTARC — which the Council had requested should track and record civilian casualties — and stressed the importance of making the cell fully operational. The Council also emphasised that relevant information should be shared with the UN, incorporated into AMISOM's reporting and used to inform operational guidelines and plans. Despite the challenges it faced, AMISOM played an important role in securing Somalia's 2016–2017 electoral process and strengthening the legitimacy of the federal government.

This report recognises the importance of the HRDDP to the AU–UN relationship, particularly the conditions it places on UN support. However, the discussion above is intended only to situate the policy within the broader evolution of the partnership. A subsequent report will examine the HRDDP in greater depth. As the AU–UN partnership continues to evolve, it is important to understand how the two organisations operate both collectively and independently, including in their engagement with RECs/RMs. The report therefore turns next to their respective roles in supporting regional peace and security efforts through the RECs/RMs.

THE AU-REC/RM PARTNERSHIP

The AU and RECs/RMs play an important role in promoting peace and security on the continent. Their growing authority reflects the evolution of African institutions as legitimate actors in continental peace and security. Since the 1980s, the RECs have been recognised as central to African regional integration and have become an important part of the AU's work. The Abuja Treaty and the AU Constitutive Act provide the legal basis for this relationship. It is further governed by the 2008 Protocol on Relations between the RECs and the AU and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and RECs/RMs.

Article 33 of the protocol stipulates that it enters into force once signed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the chief executives of at least three RECs. This threshold was met on 10 November 2021, and no further ratification was required. The MoU, meanwhile, incorporates the principle of subsidiarity: peace, security and integration matters should be addressed by the lowest competent authority—principally the RECs—before being escalated to the continental level.

A central tension nevertheless remains between subsidiarity and the AU's centralised normative authority. The evolving roles of the AU and RECs/RMs have produced a normative and institutional framework intended to give effect to their respective mandates across multiple policy areas. Both the AU and RECs/RMs have consequently gained legitimacy in addressing issues that affect not only the African continent but also the wider international system. The AU has become an important actor in international agenda-setting, norm development, policymaking and strategic partnerships. However, this legitimacy remains vulnerable.

The parties have therefore concluded a series of agreements intended to accommodate the changing nature of their relationship and Africa's evolving peace and security landscape. A recent MoU on the African Standby Force (ASF), signed by the[40] AUC and the RECs/RMs, provides a legal framework clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the respective stakeholders. This section reviews the relationship between the AU and RECs/RMs against the backdrop of efforts towards the continent's political, peace and security integration. It examines patterns of institutional interaction and draws on selected examples to illustrate both the current relationship and its potential development.

Understanding the AU–REC/RM partnership

The AU PSC is the AU's principal decision-making organ for conflict prevention, management and resolution. It is a central component of the APSA, the primary continental framework for promoting peace, security and stability. Established in 2002 as a long-term structural response to conflict, APSA was intended to provide the AU and subregional organisations with the tools needed to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. In 2016, for example, the AU and subregional organisations intervened in 28 of the 67 violent conflicts recorded in Africa, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, peace support operations or a combination of these approaches.[41]

A 2010 assessment of APSA's operationalisation, commissioned by the AU Peace and Security Department, found that many RECs/RMs did not regard the architecture in its existing form as sufficiently comprehensive or coherent to address the continent's security challenges.[42] The study nevertheless identified progress in

coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs, particularly in operationalising the ASF and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). Progress in these areas was greater than for other APSA components, including the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund. The assessment also found that institutional links between the AU PSC and comparable organs within the RECs were largely absent. Moreover, it remained unclear how the principle of subsidiarity should be applied in relations between the AU and RECs/RMs, particularly whether the AU should act primarily as an implementer or coordinator.[43]

A 2018 study commissioned by the AU PSC to assess the implementation of APSA between 2002 and 2018 reached similar conclusions. It found that coordination and collaboration between the AU and RECs/RMs remained too weak to support the effective implementation of APSA.[44] Identified challenges included differing interpretations of subsidiarity, competition between the AU and RECs/RMs, limited opportunities for REC input into PSC decision-making and insufficient liaison between the AU PSC and the security organs of the RECs.

The study also offered a possible interpretation of subsidiarity within APSA: "PSC efforts are only expected to complement those of the RECs/RMs which enjoy comparative advantages by virtue of being near to and better informed about the real dynamics in the theatres of conflicts/crises" (52). The findings of these assessments informed two AU roadmaps intended to clarify the operation of APSA and the role of RECs/RMs in African security. The 2011–2013 and 2016–2020 roadmaps sought to strengthen collaboration and coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs.[45] The latter acknowledged the continuing difficulty of determining how subsidiarity should apply to their security relations. It therefore prioritised dialogue aimed at developing a shared definition of subsidiarity and guidelines for its application to relations between the AU PSC and RECs/RMs.

Policy analyses of security relations between the AU and RECs/RMs have also questioned the role accorded to subsidiarity. A 2023 report argues that an emphasis on subsidiarity can obscure other mechanisms for cooperation between the AU and RECs/RMs. Although RECs/RMs may possess detailed knowledge of security threats within their respective regions, this does not preclude a role for the AU.[46] As the report notes, "Subsidiarity should […] be approached not as a principle that prevents the engagement of the AU but one that operates along with the principles of the primacy of the AU and comparative advantages".

Another report on the AU PSC identifies ambiguity among AU member states regarding subsidiarity. It observes that the AU's legal framework "recognises the primacy of both continental and regional levels in peace and security" but does not clearly define how subsidiarity should operate.[47] The experience of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), one of the AU's recognised RECs, illustrates this ambiguity. Although IGAD assumed a leading role in responding to conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia, it did not intervene immediately in the conflict in Tigray or appoint special envoys to lead mediation efforts. IGAD acquired a formal role only after the AU initiated peace talks in Pretoria and invited its representatives to participate as observers. This suggests that, although IGAD has a broad mandate to promote regional peace and security, its institutional capacity to implement that mandate remains limited, particularly when a conflict concerns the internal affairs of a member state.[48]

Unlike the AU–UN partnership, which is supported by regular desk-to-desk engagement and joint coordination mechanisms, relations between the AU and RECs/RMs lack regular, institutionalised meetings between their senior leadership and comparable technical-level information exchanges.[49] Cooperation often remains ad hoc and would benefit from clearer strategic direction, stronger leadership and more consistent guidance. Weak coordination can generate frustration and contribute to inadequate responses.[50]

One mechanism that has improved coordination is the secondment of REC liaison officers to AU headquarters. These officers are expected to attend meetings of the AU PSC, the Panel of the Wise and other AU forums as observers. They provide their respective organisations with current information, while also helping to facilitate common positions and joint action.[51] Over the past two decades, the RECs have increasingly positioned themselves as first responders to regional conflicts. The results have nevertheless been mixed, as RECs/RMs have adopted differing approaches that have not always proved effective in addressing insecurity.

IGAD's engagement in peace and security processes in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Kenya has, in some respects, helped strengthen its partnership with the AU. Since 1996, IGAD and the AU — including its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) — have collaborated on mediation and peacebuilding processes in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. The AU's CEWS and IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) have supported a close working relationship between the two institutions. Their cooperation on peace operations, including AMISOM, ATMIS and UNAMID, also presents opportunities for a stronger high-level partnership.

For the RECs in general, it is essential to recognise their comparative advantages. IGAD's comparative advantage lies partly in its regional knowledge and established conflict-prevention mechanisms. CEWARN has supported the organisation's mediation work, including the Somali peace process that preceded the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government and its responses to the outbreaks of civil war in South Sudan in 2013 and 2016. IGAD has also developed institutional knowledge through its Mediation Support Unit (MSU), established in 2012. The MSU regularly works with member-state governments to strengthen their mediation capacity, which can in turn support AU-led mediation in the region.[52]

Ongoing institutional reforms within the AU are producing significant legal and institutional changes in its relationship with RECs/RMs. Clarifying the respective roles and responsibilities of the institutions, reviewing the implementation of existing agreements and strengthening compliance mechanisms will be critical to responding effectively to emerging challenges. Despite several examples of successful cooperation based on subsidiarity, the AU–IGAD partnership continues to face considerable obstacles. These include limited financial and technical capacity, weak coordination, incomplete legal frameworks and political barriers.

IGAD's relationship with the AU differs from that of ECOWAS. One relatively underexplored issue is how the AU and ECOWAS coordinate their responses to political crises, particularly where the military occupies a central role in the state. In recent years, the AU and RECs have sought to strengthen their partnership in responding to such crises.[53] The RECs have increasingly assumed the role of first responder, particularly in West Africa, where conflicts spread across several countries during the 1990s and early 2000s. Over time, ECOWAS has taken the lead in responding to crises in the region, while the AU has provided coordination, support and continental legitimacy.

More recently, the AUC and RECs/RMs signed an MoU on the ASF that provides a legal framework clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the relevant stakeholders.[54] The partnership is intended to increase the effectiveness of conflict responses by drawing on the regional proximity and contextual knowledge of the RECs, with the AU playing a complementary or, where necessary, leading role.

The 2016–2017 political crisis in The Gambia illustrates both the potential and the limitations of this relationship. Although the AU and ECOWAS were aligned in condemning former president Yahya Jammeh's refusal to accept his electoral defeat, ECOWAS led the efforts to secure his departure. The subsequent deployment of ECOMIG reinforced the political settlement. The AU complemented these efforts by providing technical assistance under its Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Policy.

In May 2017, the AU, ECOWAS, EU and UN conducted a joint assessment to review the situation and identify priority areas for supporting the new government.[55] The assessment highlighted the urgent need to depoliticise and right-size the security sector, demilitarise the police, advance reconciliation and support economic recovery. Although the assessment was intended to coordinate the four organisations' work in these areas, the extent of the resulting collaboration remains unclear.

The AU also conducted a separate needs assessment, which informed the deployment of the AU Technical Support Team to The Gambia (AUTSTG). Later that year, a 27-member technical working group supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted another security-sector assessment, overlapping with aspects of the AU's work.[56] The latter assessment identified an absence of overarching policies and standard operating procedures for the management and administration of security institutions. It also found no policy framework governing interoperability within the security sector and identified weak or non-existent oversight by the ministries of defence and interior, the National Assembly and civil society.

According to a senior diplomat, coordination between the AU and ECOWAS was strong during the initial phase of the crisis response from 2016 onwards. It subsequently declined, with the two organisations increasingly operating in silos and their interaction eventually becoming minimal. Cooperation appears to have weakened further from 2018 as the political transition continued.[57] Consequently, the two organisations addressed similar issues and frequently engaged with the same interlocutors without establishing more effective coordination. This reflected competing priorities and the absence of a structured coordination mechanism.[58]

The mandates of AUTSTG and ECOMIG covered several similar priority areas but differed in their immediate focus.[59] AUTSTG concentrated on long-term governance and institutional reform, while ECOMIG prioritised security and stabilisation. Both mandates supported security sector reform (SSR) and transitional justice. AUTSTG worked with the Gambian government on policy development, legal reform and institutional capacity-building. ECOMIG, meanwhile, focused on stabilisation, training and restructuring within the Gambia Armed Forces (GAF) and the police.

These distinct but closely related mandates sometimes produced parallel initiatives. The AU's broader vision for SSR was not always integrated into ECOMIG's operational activities, while the government's slow implementation of reforms recommended by AUTSTG generated frustration within both missions. As the AU advocated comprehensive institutional reforms, ECOMIG continued to address immediate security concerns, occasionally resulting in inconsistent approaches. Neither organisation sought to establish a joint situation room, which could have reduced duplication, lowered transaction costs and promoted more consistent joint action.[60]

Interviewees described a clear "disconnect between the charters and protocols of the AU and ECOWAS".[61] For example, the AU has adopted a Transitional Justice Policy, while ECOWAS has no equivalent policy despite previously supporting transitional justice initiatives.[62]

This section has demonstrated that the AU–REC/RM partnership is central to Africa's peace and security architecture. Regional organisations are increasingly recognised as legitimate actors and are often better positioned to act as first responders because of their proximity, contextual knowledge and established regional relationships. However, the effectiveness of the partnership remains constrained by uncertainty surrounding subsidiarity, particularly regarding when RECs/RMs should lead and when the AU should coordinate, complement or assume responsibility.

The experiences of IGAD and ECOWAS demonstrate both the value and limitations of regional leadership. IGAD has developed considerable expertise in mediation and early warning, while ECOWAS has demonstrated a strong capacity for rapid political and security responses. Both organisations nevertheless face institutional, financial and political constraints. The effectiveness of Africa's peace and security architecture therefore depends less on creating new mandates than on clarifying roles and responsibilities, institutionalising coordination, improving information-sharing and ensuring sustained political, technical and financial support across the AU and RECs/RMs.

The preceding sections will examine have examined the complex and evolving relationships between the AU, UN and RECs/RMs, including in a multi-actor setting such as The Gambia. The next section draws on quantitative data to analyse AU and UN support for POC within REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs.

ANALYSIS OF AU AND UN SUPPORT TO POC IN REC-LED PSOS, ASIS AND ESAS

As noted in the preceding sections, RECs/RMs are integral to the implementation of the APSA. African states and regional organisations have also increasingly adopted new forms of African-led security arrangements, including ASIs and ESAs, which differ from AU-led PSOs in their mandates, composition and institutional structures.[63] To map the support provided by the AU and UN for POC across these arrangements, the analysis examines six REC-led PSOs, three ASIs and four ESAs.

As outlined in the research methods section, each mission is assessed across three pillars: AU support, UN support and POC implementation. Each pillar comprises five sub-dimensions scored on a scale from zero to three, giving a maximum score of 15 per pillar. This section first introduces the individual cases before analysing the support provided for POC and its implementation within each mission.

REC-led PSOs

The Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX)

MICOPAX is one of the REC-led PSOs included in the database for which support relating to POC was identified. The mission operated in the Central African Republic (CAR) and was authorised by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in July 2008. It remained active until December 2013.[64] Its initial mandate was to consolidate peace and security, support the political process and promote respect for human rights. The mandate also extended to supporting preparations for elections.[65]

Although MICOPAX played an important stabilisation role, its limited troop strength prevented it from stopping Séléka rebels from entering the capital when the conflict escalated in late 2012. The ECCAS heads of state subsequently decided to reconfigure the mission by increasing its troop strength and revising its mandate. The new mandate included restoring stability, protecting civilians, supporting the restructuring of the country's security forces and assisting with the organisation of elections.[66]

The mission's capacity nevertheless remained limited. In July 2013, the AU PSC authorised the deployment of MISCA. Authority was transferred from ECCAS and MICOPAX to the AU and MISCA on 19 December 2013.[67] MISCA was subsequently succeeded by MINUSCA, which the UNSC authorised through UNSCR 2149 on 10 April 2014.[68]

ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG)

Two ECOWAS-authorised PSOs are included in the analysis: ECOMIG and the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB). Launched in January 2017, ECOMIG was tasked with safeguarding The Gambia's stability and fragile democracy during its political transition.[69]

Initially comprising approximately 500 troops from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, the mission has trained and assisted the Gambian armed forces and police in maintaining internal security and defending the country against external threats. ECOMIG personnel have also provided close protection for the president and government officials, patrolled strategic sites such as Banjul International Airport and secured the Barra ferry terminal.[70] ECOMIG's mandate has been extended repeatedly since its deployment. At its 67th Ordinary Session in June 2025, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State

and Government approved a final 24-month extension from the end of the mission's existing mandate. It also instructed the ECOWAS Commission to develop an exit strategy, including plans for the mission's drawdown and liquidation.[71]

ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB)

ECOMIB was a stabilisation force established by ECOWAS following the coup d'état of 12 April 2012, which overthrew the government of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior.[72] Troops were deployed on 18 May 2012, initially to oversee the peaceful withdrawal of the Angolan Mission of Support to Reform in the Defence and Security Sector (MISSANG). The withdrawal was completed by early June.

In November 2012, ECOWAS signed a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and an MoU with the Government of Guinea-Bissau. These agreements expanded ECOMIB's role to include securing key state institutions, supporting the country's political transition and advancing defence and security sector reform (DSSR).[73] Although the mission was initially expected to draw down and withdraw in 2017, ECOWAS repeatedly extended its mandate because of the continuing political crisis. ECOMIB formally concluded its mandate and withdrew from Guinea-Bissau in September 2020.[74] The EU and ECOWAS held an official ceremony marking the mission's departure on 10 November 2020.[75]

The SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho (SAPMIL)

Three of the REC-led PSOs included in the analysis were launched by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The first, the SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho (SAPMIL), was launched on 2 December 2017. Its mandate was to help create a secure, stable and peaceful environment conducive to the rule of law and the implementation of constitutional, parliamentary, judicial, public-sector and security-sector reforms.[76] The mission was deployed at the request of the Government of Lesotho to complement national efforts to achieve lasting peace and security.[77]

SAPMIL initially received a six-month mandate, which was extended for a further six months in April 2018. SADC officially closed the mission on 20 November 2018 and withdrew from Maseru after determining that the security situation had sufficiently stabilised.[78]

The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)

The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), deployed in Cabo Delgado from July 2021 to July 2024, was a REC-led PSO and counterterrorism operation. SADC authorised the mission to neutralise the Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah (ASWJ) insurgency, restore security and support humanitarian relief.[79] Initially deployed under ASF Scenario 6 as a robust military intervention, SAMIM transitioned to Scenario 5 in August 2022 and became a multidimensional operation with civilian and police components.[80]

Throughout its deployment, SAMIM struggled to fulfil its mandate because of a persistent gap between its assigned tasks and strategic objectives on the one hand, and its deployed capabilities on the other. Limited coordination with the host government and Rwandan forces, together with insufficient host-state political support, further contributed to the decision by SADC member states to close the mission. SAMIM officially concluded its operations on 15 July 2024, although conditions on the ground did not appear conducive to a complete withdrawal at that time.[81]

The SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC)

SADC's third and most recent REC-led mission included in the database was deployed to the DRC. The SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (SAMIDRC) was a regional military deployment intended to help restore peace and security in the eastern DRC.[82] It was

approved by an Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government in May 2023 and deployed on 15 December 2023 in response to the deteriorating security situation in the region.[83]

SAMIDRC was mandated to support the DRC in neutralising armed groups and strengthening the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo; FARDC). Its mandate also included protecting civilians and their property against imminent threats from hostile forces and illegal armed groups.[84] However, capability constraints, limited cooperation with the Congolese armed forces and strategic ambiguity undermined implementation of the mandate. SADC officially began the phased withdrawal of SAMIDRC on 29 April 2025.[85]

Ad hoc security initiatives

Over the past decade and a half, the continued evolution of the conflict landscape in Africa has led to the emergence of ASIs. These initiatives have been designed and deployed to address insecurity linked with various forms of insurgency and their violence. They have also emerged as context-specific responses to armed groups that operate across borders at the regional level. ASIs are ultimately a form of collective self-defence or "intervention by invitation", operating with host-state consent under Article 51 of the UN Charter and aligning with the AU's Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP).[86]

For the purposes of this report, ASIs are defined primarily by their mode of establishment. They arise through informal, state-driven political processes among affected countries rather than through the AU's standing peace and security architecture. AU or UN authorisation is not necessarily a legal prerequisite for their operation. Where subsequent endorsement has been provided, it has conferred additional political legitimacy rather than constituted the initiative's original legal basis.[87] The analysis examines three ASIs: the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the FC-G5S.

The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)

The RCI-LRA was a joint political and military initiative supported by the AU to defeat Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The AU PSC authorised its launch at the Council's 295th meeting on 22 November 2011 for an initial six-month period.[88] Its mandate

was to strengthen the operational capacity of countries affected by LRA violence, create conditions conducive to stabilising affected areas and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

A Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM), led by an AU Special Envoy, provided political and strategic oversight. The initiative's operational arm was a multinational Regional Task Force (RTF), comprising troops contributed by the affected countries: Uganda, South Sudan, the CAR and the DRC.[89] Uganda withdrew from the initiative in April 2017 after determining that the LRA no longer posed a direct threat to its territory. At its 795th meeting, the AU PSC formalised the decision to dissolve the RCI-LRA, subject to the development of a phase-out plan and exit strategy.[90]

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

The MNJTF operates under the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), whose regional security role was revived through an ad hoc ministerial process in 2014–2015 in response to the growing threat from Boko Haram.[91] The AU authorised the force in January 2015 as a regional security arrangement under the LCBC.

The MNJTF is mandated to create a safe and secure environment in areas affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, reduce attacks against civilians, support stabilisation programmes in the Lake Chad Basin and facilitate humanitarian operations and assistance to affected populations.[92] To achieve its mandate, MNJTF undertakes both kinetic and non-kinetic operations.

The mission has nevertheless faced persistent constraints, including insufficient funding, gaps in operational command and control, inadequate equipment and weak intelligence-sharing arrangements. Although the MNJTF has achieved some operational gains, these limitations continue to impede its efforts to address armed groups operating across the Lake Chad Basin.[93,94] Niger's announcement in March 2025 that it would withdraw from the MNJTF raised further concerns about the force's capacity and the possibility of a security vacuum that armed groups could exploit.[95] Despite these challenges, the AU PSC has continued to renew the MNJTF's mandate, including for a further 12 months in December 2025.[96]

The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S)

The FC-G5S was established to address terrorism and transnational organised crime across its five member states: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The initiative sought to strengthen the safety and security of their populations and create conditions conducive to socioeconomic development by coordinating national efforts against shared security threats.[97]

The force received international political support through UNSCRs 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017) and 2480 (2019). It had an authorised strength of approximately 5,600 personnel organised across three geographical sectors. However, its operations were constrained by weak intelligence capabilities, equipment shortages, limited air support and an inadequate rapid-response capacity.[98]

Mali withdrew from both the wider G5 Sahel framework and the joint force in May 2022. Burkina Faso and Niger subsequently withdrew from the FC-G5S in late 2023. On 6 December 2023, the remaining members announced the dissolution of the G5 Sahel institutional framework.[99]

Enterprise security arrangements

Alongside ASIs, ESAs have emerged as another form of African-led security operation. Unlike

missions established through the AU or the RECs/RMs, these arrangements generally lack formal mandates or institutional backing from the AU, UN or RECs/RMs.[100] For the purposes of this report, ESAs are defined as military deployments by one state, or a group of states, to a host country at its invitation and for an extended period.[101]

These arrangements are generally intended to combat insurgents, terrorist organisations or cross-border criminal activity, or to prevent armed groups from returning to launch further attacks. They are predominantly military operations and often lack the civilian structures required to support a comprehensive approach to protection and POC.[102] The cases examined here are the Accra Initiative, the Alliance of Sahel States, Operation Shujaa and the bilateral Rwanda–Mozambique deployment.

The Accra Initiative

The Accra Initiative was created in 2017 to prevent insecurity and violent extremism from spreading southwards from the Sahel. Its five founding members were Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. Mali and Niger later joined as members, while Nigeria acquired observer status.[103]

In 2022, participating states proposed transforming the initiative into a multinational joint task force. Its mandate centres on developing a layered regional security architecture through joint border patrols, intelligence-sharing and multinational operations across the territories of participating states. The initiative maintains a permanent secretariat in Accra, an operational headquarters in Tamale and national focal points across participating countries.[104]

The Accra Initiative launched its first joint operation, Operation Koudanlgou I, in May 2018. Three further joint operations followed: Koudanlgou II in November 2018, Koudanlgou III in November 2019 and Koudanlgou IV in November 2021.[105]

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES)

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was established by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in September 2023. It was subsequently formalised as a confederation in July 2024. Its principal areas of cooperation include collective defence and mutual assistance in responding to armed aggression, terrorism, transnational organised crime and other threats affecting the three states.[106]

The withdrawal of the three AES countries from ECOWAS took effect in January 2025. This development, together with strained relations between the countries and the AU, has complicated formal engagement between the AU and AES. Nevertheless, the AU has continued its efforts to restore dialogue. On 30 September 2025, the AU PSC called for the establishment of a task force to support Sahel countries in combating terrorism.[107]

In April 2026, the Chairperson of the AU and President of Burundi, Évariste Ndayishimiye, met the President of Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who was also serving as President of the AES Confederation. Following the meeting, Ndayishimiye called for the AU and AES to work towards a shared future and stronger institutional relations.[108]

The Rwanda–Mozambique deployment to Cabo Delgado

The bilateral security arrangement between Rwanda and Mozambique is another ESA included in the analysis. At the request of the Mozambican government, Rwanda deployed approximately 1,000 troops and police officers to Cabo Delgado in July 2021. The deployment was intended to combat terrorism and insecurity, restore state authority and support stabilisation

efforts.[109] By May 2024, the Rwandan contingent had grown to approximately 4,000 personnel from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and the Rwanda National Police (RNP).[110]

The Rwandan Ministry of Defence (MOD) situated the deployment within the two countries' bilateral relationship and the agreements they signed in 2018. It also linked the intervention to Rwanda's commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and the 2015 Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians.[111]

Operation Shujaa to the eastern DRC

Operation Shujaa is a bilateral military operation conducted by the DRC and Uganda against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the eastern DRC. It was launched in November 2021 following a series of suicide attacks in Kampala during October and November of that year.[112] After the attacks were attributed to the ADF, the governments of the DRC and Uganda agreed to conduct joint operations in north-eastern Congo aimed at dismantling the organisation. The two countries formalised their cooperation through a defence and security agreement signed on 9 December 2021.[113]

The operation is conducted jointly by the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) and FARDC. Their objectives include neutralising the ADF, dismantling its camps and logistical networks, securing key transport routes and protecting communities from further attacks.[114]


UNDERSTANDING AU AND UN SUPPORT FOR REC-LED PSOS, ASIS AND ESAS

The discussion now turns to what the data reveal about the relationship between AU and UN support and POC implementation across the REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs described above. UN support for African-led PSOs with POC mandates is governed by the HRDDP. The policy gives the UN considerable leverage by allowing it to attach conditions and mitigation requirements to the support it provides to non-UN security forces.

The AU does not possess comparable institutional leverage and has therefore relied on policy engagement and other forms of persuasion to encourage mandating authorities to comply with its POC standards. The disparity in resources between the two organisations is also significant. The UN has greater financial and operational capacity to provide support and make that support conditional on POC compliance. The AU lacks comparable resources, including in its own missions in Somalia, and remains heavily dependent on partners such as the UN for essential operational enablers.

Figure 1 illustrates a broad association between combined AU and UN support and POC implementation across the REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs. The x-axis represents AU support for POC, while the y-axis represents UN support. Bubble size reflects the POC implementation score, ranging from zero to 15. Green bubbles represent ESAs, blue bubbles represent REC-led PSOs and red bubbles represent ASIs.


Figure 1: AU and UN support for POC implementation across REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs;



Source: Authors' own

Figure 2 further visualises this dynamic through normalised averages (from zero to three) for each mission, allowing for direct comparison of the relative strength of each pillar within and across missions.

Figure 2: Average category totals by mission



Source: Authors' own

Both figures 1 and 2 demonstrate a broad association between high levels of AU and UN support for POC and corresponding levels of POC implementation. This is particularly clear at the two ends of the scale: the missions receiving the most support are also the strongest POC performers, while those receiving the least support are the weakest. The data show that the MNJTF, FC-G5S and SAMIDRC are the three strongest POC performers in the database and receive the highest combined scores for AU and UN support. For the MNJTF, the AU has deployed a Mission Support Team that provides an on-site institutional backbone for mission support and compliance advice.[115]

The AU Support Programme provides a civilian component, Human Rights Unit and Humanitarian Liaison Unit, which help develop POC policies, monitor obligations and connect the MNJTF to AU standards on POC and SEA.[116] This translates into a high score across all five AU support sub-dimensions. The UN support score reflects the work of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNDP in providing protection coordination, stabilisation support and civil-

military assistance across the MNJTF's area of operations. The MNJTF also has a formal POC mandate, implemented primarily by creating a secure environment, facilitating stabilisation and humanitarian operations and applying the Regional Stabilisation Strategy (RSS) and the subsequent Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR).[117]

The RSS and RS-SRR pillars relating to security and human rights, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), women and youth all contribute to the mission's POC responsibilities. Harm tracking, however, remains a significant gap. The AU PSC has recorded funding shortfalls and requested that the AUC explore financing through UNSCR 2719.[118] This challenge is compounded by the mission's structure. Its contingents consist of national forces operating mainly within their own borders and remaining accountable to national chains of command, making it difficult for the MNJTF to establish a centralised mechanism for tracking civilian harm.[119]

The FC-G5S's CONOPs were formally endorsed by the AU PSC in 2017.[120] The force was authorised, rather than commanded, by the AU. The role of the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) was therefore advisory and supportive rather than one of command and control. The UNSC welcomed the Joint Force through resolution 2359,[121] alongside the establishment of the OHCHR-led Human Rights and IHL Compliance Framework, which was designed to operationalise measures to reduce civilian harm and respond to violations.[122] With support from OHCHR, the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) and the EU, the Joint Force established the Civilian Casualty Identification, Tracking and Analysis Cell (CITAC), which was launched in Bamako in January 2021.[123]

Alongside implementing the Human Rights and IHL Compliance Framework and CITAC, the FC-G5S conducted joint border patrols intended to reduce attacks against civilians in the Mali–Niger–Burkina Faso tri-border area, escorted humanitarian actors through high-risk areas, delivered dedicated pre-deployment training on POC practices and established CIMIC cells for community engagement.[124] Nevertheless, a CIVIC report found that the FC-G5S continued to face challenges arising from the operational environment, the nature of the threat and prevailing cultural norms, despite the measures it had introduced to fulfil its POC responsibilities.[125]

SAMIDRC also received institutional backing from both the AU and UN, which participated in the Goma Consultations on an IHL and human rights compliance framework for the mission. The AU provided SADC with AUCAF tools and standards relating to POC and SEA, endorsed the deployment within the ASF framework and monitored the evolution of the mandate and its protection implications.[126] The UNSC also authorised direct operational and logistical support to SAMIDRC through the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) under resolution 2746. The UN Secretary-General described coordination between the two missions as a test case for UN support to AU-led missions under the framework established by UNSCR 2719 (2023).[127] SAMIDRC had an explicit mandate to protect civilians, and its Rules of Engagement (ROE) were designed to balance offensive and defensive operations with civilian protection.

The mission conducted joint operations with FARDC against armed groups threatening civilians, maintained a CIMIC structure and secured humanitarian access routes, including routes serving camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) near Beni and Butembo.[128] Nevertheless, results on the ground were mixed. SAMIDRC deployed with a substantially smaller force than originally envisaged and lacked its own air support, limiting its capacity to reinforce threatened positions and evacuate casualties.[129]

Unlike the missions discussed above, MICOPAX, ECOMIG, ECOMIB and SAPMIL demonstrate the same association at lower levels of both AU and UN support and POC implementation. MICOPAX had no standalone POC mandate, although it was authorised after the 2012 crisis to use minimum force to protect civilians facing an imminent threat. Moreover, MICOPAX had neither a dedicated POC unit nor a mechanism for monitoring civilian protection, and a UNSC briefing described its POC capacity as "seriously limited".[130] MICOPAX was succeeded first by MISCA and subsequently by MINUSCA, both of which had stronger POC mandates from the outset. ECOMIG, ECOMIB and SAPMIL similarly lacked explicit, standalone POC mandates, although each received some POC-related scores, principally under the deterrence-through-presence sub-dimension.

For example, ECOMIG maintained a preventive presence, conducted street patrols and supported SSR. These activities can be understood as providing physical protection through deterrence and contributing to a protective environment — the second and fourth AU pillars — despite the absence of a formal POC mandate. Similarly, ECOMIB provided a security umbrella by securing state institutions, deterring violence and protecting humanitarian corridors.[131] Meanwhile, the joint AU technical assessment of SADC's SAPMIL found "a general view by all stakeholders that SAPMIL has acted as a deterrent" in Lesotho.[132]

SAMIM sits between the medium-scoring group — MICOPAX, ECOMIG, ECOMIB and SAPMIL — and the strongest performers: the MNJTF, FC-G5S and SAMIDRC. Between 2022 and 2023, the AU Continental Logistics Base supplied SAMIM with approximately USD 14 million in equipment, which was formally handed over in Pemba in November 2023. SAMIM is the only mission in the database to receive the maximum score for AU financial and logistical support. The AU PSC also endorsed SAMIM within the ASF framework as a peace enforcement mission.[133] UN support for the mission was more limited and indirect. For example, OHCHR implemented a human-rights-based approach project with Mozambican judicial actors, while UNHCR led the Protection Cluster in Cabo Delgado; however, neither engaged directly with SAMIM personnel. The UNSC commended the mission but did not authorise or finance it. Capacity-building support instead came from the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[134] SAMIM's mandate included humanitarian relief and the protection of civilians facing imminent threats, while its offensive operations created a more secure environment for humanitarian access in some districts. Nevertheless, SAMIM's civilian-protection record was uneven. Although the mission achieved some success in Nangade, it faced an "obvious" failure in Macomia, where insurgent forces remained entrenched despite its presence.[135] Civilians in affected districts also reported slow responses to attacks, while allegations of abuse by SAMIM personnel were not followed by any recorded investigation. This points to the absence of a formal harm-tracking mechanism within the mission.[136]

The RCI-LRA received the strongest AU backing of any mission in the database. The AU PSC acted as the authorising body, a Joint Coordination Mechanism was chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, 30 AU staff officers were embedded at the RTF headquarters in Yambio and a dedicated AU Special Envoy for the LRA coordinated the four affected states and briefed the UNSC.[137] UN support complemented these arrangements through the UN Regional Strategy on the LRA, with OCHA, UNHCR, MONUSCO and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) contributing to cross-border coordination, disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) and child protection.[138]

The mandate encompassed civilian protection, humanitarian access and stabilisation. POC-related practices included establishing forward

bases near communities, patrolling known attack routes and escorting displaced people. Nevertheless, an independent 2015 assessment found that the AU's formal commitment to POC and IHL was strong in rhetoric but weak in implementation. Despite clear PSC directives and normative frameworks — including the Constitutive Act, POC Guidelines and IHL instruments — the AU did not operationalise effective oversight, training or civilian-engagement mechanisms.[139] Consequently, the RTF pursued its military objectives with minimal humanitarian accountability, leaving civilian protection largely incidental and unmonitored.[140]

The Accra Initiative and AES illustrate what limited AU and UN support for POC looks like. In the case of the Accra Initiative, AU and UN support occurs primarily at the coordination level rather than being explicitly protection-focused. The AU has not authorised the initiative through the PSC or embedded personnel within it. Instead, it has engaged indirectly through annual Nouakchott Process meetings and a September 2025 MoU with Nigeria's National Counter Terrorism Centre. The MoU refers to support for regional initiatives such as the Accra Initiative, including work on victim recovery, deradicalisation and reintegration.[141,142]

UN engagement is similarly indirect. It includes a 2024 training programme implemented by UNDP and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), as well as a 2025 effort by the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and Ghana's Ministry of the Interior to revitalise the initiative. Both forms of engagement are framed primarily around counterterrorism rather than POC.[143,144] The Accra Initiative's principal operational objectives are counterterrorism and border security, and it has no formal POC mandate.[145] Some of its activities nevertheless have indirect civilian-protection effects, including patrols, evacuations and early-warning procedures for border communities. However, Operations Koudanlgou I, II, III and IV were short, ad hoc deployments that temporarily disrupted armed groups without establishing a sustained presence, limiting their deterrent effect.[146]

There is also no independent mechanism for tracking civilian harm or measuring protection outcomes, making claims of success difficult to verify.[147] For the AES, the gap is more pronounced. AU PSC engagement has remained limited and largely political, including re-engagement efforts through the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) and Special Envoy Ndayishimiye during 2025–2026. The Alliance is financed mainly through domestic resources and partnerships with Russia, Turkey, Gulf states and China rather than through AU or UN channels.[148,149] UN support is largely confined to OCHA's underfunded humanitarian appeals in

AES countries.[150] Human rights monitoring has also been reduced: the operations of OHCHR's Burkina Faso office were suspended and the office is scheduled to close by 30 November 2026;[151] accountability mechanisms in Niger have been curtailed;[152] and MINUSMA's human rights division was dissolved when the mission's mandate ended in 2023.[153] The AES founding charter refers to civilian protection once, in its preamble.[154] However, when the AES Unified Force was launched in December 2025,[155] there was no publicly reported POC unit, civilian harm tracking cell or compliance mechanism to operationalise this intent.

The bilateral DRC–Uganda operation against the ADF, Operation Shujaa, receives no AU support and only limited UN engagement relating to POC. It is a predominantly military operation, with no civilian or police component and no mechanism for tracking civilian harm.[156] Uganda notified the UNSC's 1533 Sanctions Committee of Operation Shujaa's deployment on 23 December 2021,[157] three weeks after UPDF troops had already entered the DRC. This was despite resolutions 1807 (2008, paragraph 5(a)), 2293 (2016) and 2582 (2021), which require advance notification of foreign troop deployments in the DRC.[158] Subsequent reports by the UN Secretary-General and the Group of Experts have nevertheless monitored developments relating to Operation Shujaa.

MONUSCO's Joint Human Rights Office also monitors the area only externally.[159] However, although the UN provides POC-related support to FARDC more generally, no UN financing or capacity-building is directed specifically towards Operation Shujaa. The operation's stated objective is to dismantle ADF command structures and prevent cross-border attacks, with no explicit POC mandate beyond what can be inferred from this broader security language. UN reporting has found that, rather than reducing the threat to civilians, Operation Shujaa displaced ADF bases into areas with minimal state security presence and that attacks within the DRC intensified rather than declined.[160]

The Rwanda–Mozambique operation differs from every other case in the database, matching SAMIM's POC score despite receiving almost no AU or UN backing. The Chairperson of the AU Commission publicly commended the deployment in July 2021 as a "strong and concrete act of African solidarity", but there is no AU PSC communiqué or institutional support structure for the operation.[161] UN engagement is limited to country-level humanitarian coordination, including the UNHCR-led Protection Cluster and OCHA-supported structures such as the Cabo Delgado Durable Solutions Working Group. This engagement is not directed towards the Rwandan force itself.[162] Rwanda's Ministry of Defence presents the deployment as reflecting the 2015 Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.[163]

An analysis by Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) links the relatively low level of direct civilian targeting by Rwandan forces to this doctrine. It records two civilian-targeting events involving RDF personnel over three and a half years, compared with between 8% and 21% of violence attributed to the Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique (FADM) and up to 50% of police violence targeting civilians.[164] The same analysis notes that Rwandan forces shifted from combat operations towards "building rapport with communities" through visible mounted and foot patrols, community public-works projects and access for local residents to RDF health facilities. Nevertheless, along the militarised N380 corridor, Rwandan forces have increasingly failed to prevent or respond to insurgent attacks against civilians. This suggests that the operation's capacity to protect civilians has weakened in specific geographical areas rather than uniformly across its entire area of operations.[165]

Although the discussion above provides some insight into support for POC across REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs, two important dimensions are not adequately captured by the data. First, the role of CSOs appears only indirectly and is generally attributed to whichever institution receives credit for the support. For example, CIVIC co-designed the FC-G5S's CITAC, while the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) trained ECOMIB personnel on human rights and crowd control. Second, the database has no sub-dimension for assessing how POC standards are socialised or adopted from the mission level through national forces and into field-level practice.[166] The experience of the Rwandan forces also demonstrates how a state's normative culture, pre-deployment and in-mission training can shape conduct and discipline independently of the support architecture available to the host state and local communities. It suggests that strong domestic socialisation, training and the institutionalisation of doctrine can produce significant POC outcomes.

Overall, the analysis finds that explicit language establishing POC mandates is scarce and inconsistently applied across REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs, many of which have received some form of UN recognition, AU endorsement or PSC authorisation. Only the MNJTF and SAMIDRC receive the highest scores for formal mandate language. In most other cases, protection is implied through broader language concerning stability or security rather than stated explicitly. For example, SAPMIL's founding mandate did not refer expressly to POC, although its responsibilities for stabilisation, protecting the rule of law and supporting SSR were relevant to civilian protection.

The analysis also finds that physical protection through presence and deterrence consistently scores more highly across the database than rights-based protection or harm tracking. This suggests that, as POC norms have evolved within African operations, they have gradually been incorporated by the experts responsible for drafting mission mandates, CONOPS, SOPs and FRAGOs. This indicates a degree of socialisation and normalisation over the past two decades. The FC-G5S, MNJTF and SAMIDRC — the three strongest POC performers — provide evidence of this development, as all three received support anchored in AU or UN frameworks.

Among the ASIs examined — and noting that only one of the three remained operational at the time of writing — strong institutional backing did not necessarily guarantee operational capacity or compliance. Both the RCI-LRA and MNJTF lacked their own harm-tracking mechanisms despite extensive AU engagement. This suggests that AU backing alone does not explain whether such capacity is established or strengthened over time. The FC-G5S, by contrast, developed CITAC. However, this was driven more by UN pressure than by AU pressure. The force received operational and logistical support from MINUSMA that was conditional on respect for human rights under the HRDDP.[167] Compliance was therefore required throughout the provision of support, and CITAC was established partly to meet the human rights obligations attached to the Joint Force's funding.

This illustrates the broader asymmetry in institutional leverage discussed above. The UN can make its support conditional through the HRDDP, giving it a mechanism for encouraging compliance. The AU largely lacks an equivalent instrument: AUCAF currently functions as a compliance framework but does not attach comparable conditions to AU support. The AU is therefore more reliant on persuasion, partnership-building and case-by-case advocacy to secure compliance from mandating authorities.

For ESAs, the analysis finds that these operations are often centred on counterterrorism and that they primarily rely on military personnel. This is reflected in cases such as Operation

Shujaa in the eastern DRC and the security arrangements developed by the three AES states. These two cases received some of the lowest scores for support to POC and POC implementation. Despite the participating states' experience of AU PSOs, UN PKOs and FC-G5S operations, these two cases performed particularly poorly. This combination is becoming more common as states increasingly favour such arrangements. The findings suggest that ESAs tend to adopt narrower and more militarised approaches, draw less on the multidimensional experience available from AU and UN missions, and may cause greater civilian harm than earlier African-led PSOs.[168]

Nevertheless, the analysis also finds that ESAs can achieve strong POC performance without direct AU or UN support, although independent accountability mechanisms tend to be absent. The Rwanda–Mozambique security cooperation is the clearest example: both states have strong normative cultures at the military level that promote discipline and limit civilian harm during operations. More broadly, the findings show that AU and UN support to POC for REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs is important in strengthening mission performance. However, host and sending states involved in ESAs often receive UN logistical or financial support in other peace and security contexts. This gives the UN greater scope to use the conditionality mechanisms available under the HRDDP to encourage improved POC practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Proactive mission posture and enhanced intelligence: Strengthen training and equip forces with the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities required to act on early-warning information. Missions should be able to anticipate, deter and respond to emerging threats while remaining accountable to civilian protection standards. A proactive posture should actively deter armed groups, protect civilians and enable missions to act on intelligence rather than merely react to violence.

Contingency planning: Ensure that REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs have contingency plans that anticipate future scenarios, including patterns of retaliation against civilians following military operations. Contingency planning should be integrated into mission planning, early-warning systems and decision-making processes.

Pre-deployment and in-mission training: Integrate standardised, specialised POC training modules aligned with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and international humanitarian law (IHL). While work is ongoing between the AU and UN, both within and beyond the framework of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2719, including through a joint task force, further efforts are needed to ensure that selection processes for REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs prioritise high-calibre battalion and sector commanders with experience in POC, tactical initiative and support for community-led protection mechanisms.

Joint lessons learned: Use joint AU–UN mechanisms to support the development of standard operating procedures, policy documents and lessons-learned processes tailored to REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs. The AU and UN should also assist missions, operations and states in translating policy into operational procedures, personnel capabilities, training, coordination and field-level conduct.

Human rights compliance: Operationalise robust compliance frameworks to prevent and respond to abuses, with clear expectations for conduct and consequences for violations. Develop mission- and context-specific POC models grounded in clear mandates, enabling forces to build greater consistency, experience and expertise over time. The FC-G5S's development of the Civilian Casualty Identification, Tracking and Analysis Cell (CITAC) shows that compliance can be more reliably secured when conditions are attached to support, as under the UN HRDDP. The AUCAF should

operate in a similar manner when AU support is provided to REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs.

Civilian harm mitigation measures: Embed civilian-harm mitigation measures and strategies in concepts of operations, standard operating procedures, fragmentary orders and other mission documents, reporting mechanisms and policies. These measures should enable missions to track, minimise and remedy harm caused by military operations.

Socialising POC norms across all levels: REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs often use POC language in an ad hoc and indirect manner. POC norms should therefore be socialised across all levels, from mission mandates and national doctrine to conduct in the field.

Civil society: REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs should continue engaging affected communities and building trust through measures such as street patrols, community dialogue and CIMIC cells. The AU and UN should also support civil society organisation initiatives that strengthen missions' capacity to implement POC.

Strengthening accountability in ESAs: The UN should apply the HRDDP to all support provided to host and sending states involved in ESAs. Where there are substantiated allegations of serious civilian harm, host and sending states should be required to adopt mitigation measures. If these measures are not implemented, the UN should suspend or withdraw its support.

CONCLUSION

The report finds that, while the relationship between the AU and regional organisations is improving, it remains vulnerable to emerging challenges that may further slow regional integration in Africa. For the AU, UN, RECs/RMs, ASIs and ESAs to sustain their legitimacy, standing in Africa and globally, and partnerships, the RECs/RMs, ASIs and ESAs must continue to feed bottom-up perspectives into their thinking, organisational structures, actions and approaches to peace and security, drawing on experiences beyond those of the West.

The analysis adds an important qualification to this picture. AU and UN support is broadly associated with stronger POC outcomes, and the three most institutionally supported missions in the database—MNJTF, FC-G5S and SAMIDRC — are also its strongest POC performers. Nonetheless, institutional backing alone does not explain why some missions build lasting protection capacity while others do not. RCI-LRA and MNJTF lacked functioning harm-tracking mechanisms despite substantial AU engagement, while FC-G5S developed one, CITAC, largely because UN support through MINUSMA was conditional on compliance with the HRDDP rather than because of AU pressure. Compliance, in other words, appears to depend more on the conditions attached to support than simply on the amount of support a mission receives. The Rwanda–Mozambique case takes this finding further. It matches SAMIM in terms of POC implementation despite receiving almost no AU or UN backing, pointing instead to Rwanda's own pre-deployment doctrine and socialisation around the Kigali Principles.

This is a genuinely bottom-up finding, and it cuts both ways. It suggests that protection capacity can be built through a state's own normative culture rather than exclusively through AU or UN channels, in keeping with this report's broader argument for a bottom-up rather than top-down partnership. It also raises a question that the analysis cannot fully answer: how POC standards move from mission mandates to national force doctrine and conduct on the ground and, conversely, how a state's own normative culture shapes what a mission can deliver in the first place. The analysis also points to the important role that civil society organisations (CSOs) play in POC, with CIVIC co-designing FC-G5S's CITAC and the ICRC providing capacity-building support to SAMIM. Finally, as African-led responses increasingly take the form of ESAs mandated to undertake counterterrorism or counterinsurgency rather than POC, the space in which protection is left to a state's own normative culture, rather than to any AU or UN architecture, looks set to grow rather than shrink.

While the significance of UNSCR 2719 cannot be overstated, an exclusive focus on the resolution risks reducing the UN–AU relationship to a single instrument rather than seeking to elevate and transform the partnership in ways that benefit both institutions. Funding alone cannot overcome institutional and operational deficiencies. The implementation of UNSCR 2719 should therefore be assessed against three critical considerations that will shape the future of POC in Africa. First, whether it provides predictable, adequate and sustainable resources for AU-led operations, noting that it does not cover REC-led PSOs, ASIs or ESAs. Second, whether those resources strengthen missions' capacity to provide effective and accountable protection to civilians. Third, whether the resolution moves beyond the question of whether AU-led missions receive sufficient financial resources to consider what the partnership will look like beyond UNSCR 2719.

This is critical because, at the time of writing, the current UNSG has placed considerable emphasis on strengthening the partnership, but it remains uncertain whether the incoming UNSG in 2027 will build on these efforts and continue to elevate the relationship, particularly if POC remains a priority. For example, of the five candidates running for the position, only two — Macky Sall and María Fernanda Espinosa—have emphasised and articulated closer working relationships with regional organisations and political platforms, explicitly naming the AU alongside the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the League of Arab States. This creates a risk that the UN could move away from supporting REC-led PSOs, ASIs and ESAs, potentially increasing the risk of human rights violations and leaving POC largely confined to the creation of protective environments. Without embedding POC in doctrine and socialising and normalising it within troop-contributing countries, POC risks becoming increasingly marginal to broader REC-led operations and future ASIs and ESAs.

If UNSCR 2719 succeeds only in providing additional financial resources without strengthening POC structures and practices, it may address the symptoms of underfunding while leaving unresolved the implementation gap identified in this report. As the report has sought to highlight, institutional learning, accountability and the transfer of protection capacities to RECs, ASIs, ESAs and other regional and emerging mechanisms must be ensured. This relationship should not be viewed as a predominantly top-down arrangement, but as a bottom-up partnership that supports a broader transformation in how the UN and AU collectively support the protection of civilians in African conflicts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank and acknowledge the support from Mariana Llorens Zabala, who worked on the initial database during her time as a researcher with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

ENDNOTES

1. Tchie, A. E. Y., & McGowan, L. (2025). *The United Nations–African Union partnership and the protection of civilians*. International Peace Institute. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/UN-AU-Partnership-Final.pdf
2. Tchie, A. E. Y. (2023). Convenience or complementarity: The African Union's partnership with the United Nations in Sudan and South Sudan. *Politikon*, 50(3), 254–272. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2023.2244849
3. United Nations. (2024, October 21). *Communiqué of the eighth African Union–United Nations annual conference* (SG/2266) [Press release]. https://press.un.org/en/2024/sg2266.doc.htm
4. Williams, P. D. (2018). Joining forces? Regional peace operations and the United Nations. In J. A. Koops, T. Tardy, N. MacQueen, & P. D. Williams (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations (2nd ed.)*. Oxford University Press. Tchie (2023), Convenience or complementarity.
5. United Nations & African Union. (2018). *African Union–United Nations framework for the implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/au-un-implementation-framework-for-a2063-and-a2030_web_en.pdf
6. African Union. (n.d.). Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Retrieved October 24, 2026, from https://au.int/en/recs; Engel, U., & Porto, J. G. (Eds.). (2010). *Africa's new peace and security architecture: Promoting norms, institutionalizing solutions*. Ashgate; Williams, P. D. (2018). *Fighting for peace in Somalia: A history and analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017.* Oxford University Press.
7. Tchie (2023), Convenience or complementarity.
8. Jung, D. (2025). Complementary or Conflictual? Legitimation Struggles in the African Union – United Nations Peacekeeping Partnership. *International Peacekeeping*, 32(3), 589–615. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2025.2477135
9. Bah, A. S., & Jones, B. D. (2008). Peace operation partnerships: Lessons and issues from coordination to hybrid arrangements. In Center on International Cooperation, *Annual review of global peace operations 2008* (pp. 21–30). Lynne Rienner.
10. Murithi, T. (2008). The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. *African Security Review*, 17(1), 69–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2008.9627460
11. Williams, D. P, & Boutellis, A. (2014). Partnership Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations–African Union Relationship. *African Affairs* 113(451), 254–278. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu021
12. Weiss, T. G., & Welz, M. (2014). The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond: a shotgun wedding? *International Affairs*, 90(4), 889–905. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12146
13. Jung (2025), Complementary or conflictual?
14. de Coning, C. (2017). Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38(1), 145–160. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1283108

15. United Nations Security Council. (2023, December 21). *Resolution 2719* (2023) (S/RES/2719(2023)). https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2719(2023)
16. Tchie, A. E. Y. (2025). Converging global norms and institutional policies with bottom-up approaches to the protection of civilians. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 17(4), 357–379. https://doi.org/10.1163/1875984X-20250017
17. African Union. (2010). *Draft Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians in AU Peace Support Operations*. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/draft-au-poc-guidelines-english.pdf; United Nations. (2010). *Operational Concept for the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*; United Nations Department of Peace Operations. (2023). *Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping* [Policy].
18. Operations such as ASIs and ESAs do not necessarily use POC and human rights as part of their operational concepts; they tend instead to frame these loosely around protection.
19. Edu-Afful, F., Tchie, A. E. Y., Aubyn, F. K., Diallo, O. A., & Llorens Zabala, M. (2022). *Shifting from external dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the future* (EPON report). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/shifting-from-external-dependency-remodelling-the-g5-sahel-joint-force-for-the-future
20. Tchie, A. E. Y. (2023). Nomads and warlords: Chadian forces in African peace operations. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 25(4), 337–362. https://doi.org/10.1163/18754112-25040002
21. Tchie & McGowan (2025), *The United Nations–African Union partnership*.
22. Tadesse, B., & Russo, J. (2024, September 9). *UN support to African Union–led peace support operations: What next for Resolution* 2719? International Peace Institute. https://www.ipinst.org/2024/09/un-support-to-african-union-led-peace-support-operations-what-next-for-resolution-2719; Security Council Report. (2024, January 31). In hindsight: The financing of AU-led peace support operations: Assessing Council dynamics and anticipating future action. *February 2024 Monthly Forecast*. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2024-02/in-hindsight-the-financing-of-au-led-peace-support-operations-assessing-council-dynamics-and-anticipating-future-action.php; Mahdi, M. (2024, June 11). UN funds for AU peace operations: Somalia as a test case. *ISS Today*. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/un-funds-for-au-peace-operations-somalia-as-a-test-case
23. United Nations. (2026, July 22). *Review on the future of all forms of United Nations peace operations: Report of the Secretary-General* (A/80/798–S/2026/600). https://docs.un.org/en/A/80/798
24. de Coning, C., Gelot, L., & Karlsrud, J. (Eds.). (2016). T*he future of African peace operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram*. Zed Books.
25. Lakin, S. (2019, September). Lessons from the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, 25 years after the genocide it failed to stop. *The Conversation*. https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-the-un-peacekeeping-mission-in-rwanda-25-years-after-the-genocide-it-failed-to-stop-122174
26. Stewart, C., & Andersen, L. H. (2018). Partnering for peace: United Nations and African Union cooperation in peace and security. In J. Warner & T. M. Shaw (Eds.), *African foreign policies in international institutions* (pp. 165–181). Palgrave Macmillan,
27. de Coning (2017), Peace enforcement in Africa.
28. de Coning (2017), Peace enforcement in Africa.
29. United Nations. (2008, December 31). *Report of the African Union–United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations* (A/63/666–S/2008/813). https://docs.un.org/en/A/63/666

30. von Einsiedel, S., & Chandran, R. (2015, July 14). *The high-level panel and the prospects for reform of UN peace operations*. United Nations University Centre for Policy Research. https://unu.edu/cpr/blog-post/high-level-panel-and-prospects-reform-un-peace-operations
31. United Nations General Assembly. (2010, April 30). *Budget for the United Nations Office to the African Union: Report of the Secretary-General* (A/64/762). https://docs.un.org/en/A/64/762
32. United Nations General Assembly. (2010, June 24). *Financing of the United Nations Office to the African Union* (A/RES/64/288). https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/64/288
33. Vanheukelom J. & Desmidt, S. (2019). *Regional peace architectures in Africa: A reality check* (Discussion Paper No. 249). European Centre for Development Policy Management. https://ecdpm.org/work/regional-peace-architectures-in-africa-a-reality-check /
34. Authors' interview with AU and UN personnel, online, 23 June 2026.
35. United Nations Secretary-General. (2024, October 22). *Note to correspondents: Joint communiqué of the eighth African Union–United Nations annual conference*. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2024-10-22/note-correspondents-joint-communique-of-the-8th-au-un-annual-conference; United Nations. (2022, December 1). *Communiqué of the sixth African Union–United Nations annual conference* (SG/2262) [Press release]. https://press.un.org/en/2022/sg2262.doc.htmhttps://press.un.org/en/2022/sg2262.doc.htm
36. African Union. (2025, November 13). *Joint communiqué of the ninth African Union–United Nations annual conference* [Press release]. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20251113/joint-communique-ninth-african-united-nations-annual-conference; African Union. (2026, May 13). *Joint communiqué of the tenth African Union–United Nations annual conference* [Press release]. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260513/joint-communique-tenth-african-union-united-nations-annual-conference
37. United Nations. (2013, March 5). *Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces* (A/67/775–S/2013/110, annex). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/745567
38. Tchie & McGowan (2025), *The United Nations–African Union partnership*.
39. Amani Africa. (2022, December). *Review of the integration and implementation of IHL in African Union policies and activities* (Special Research Report No. 14). https://amaniafrica-et.org/review-of-the-integration-and-implementation-of-ihl-in-african-union-policies-and-activities/
40. Amani Africa. (2023, August). *Beyond subsidiarity: Understanding the roles of the AU and RECs/RMs in peace and security in Africa* (Special Research Report). https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Beyond-Subsidiarity.-Understanding-the-Roles-of-the-AU-and-RECs_RMs-in-Peace-and-Security-in-Africa-2.pdf; see also African Union Political Affairs, Peace and Security [@AUC_PAPS]. (2023, May 11). [Thread on the AU–RECs/RMs meeting] [Post]. X. https://x.com/AUC_PAPS/status/1656781693771030531
41. European Court of Auditors. (2018). *The African Peace and Security Architecture: Need to refocus EU support* (Special Report No. 20/2018). Publications Office of the European Union. https://op.europa.eu/webpub/eca/special-reports/apsa-20-2018/en/
42. African Union Peace and Security Department. (2010). *Moving Africa forward: African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 assessment study*. African Union. https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/8604
43. African Union Peace and Security Department (2010), *Moving Africa forward*.
44. African Union Peace and Security Council. (2018). *Study on the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture from 2002 to 2018*. African Union. https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/1391/ENG%20APSA%20Study.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

45. African Union Peace and Security Council. (2011). *Indicative elements for the APSA roadmap 2011–2013. African Union*. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/indicative-elements-apsa-roadmap-2011.pdf; African Union Commission. (2015). *African Peace and Security Architecture: APSA roadmap 2016–2020*. African Union. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38310-doc-9_2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf
46. Amani Africa (2023), *Beyond subsidiarity*.
47. Institute for Security Studies. (2022). The ambiguities of subsidiarity. *PSC Report*. https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-ambiguities-of-subsidiarity
48. Gebru, M. K., Zeru, G., Tronvoll, K., & Takalign, Y. (2022). Normative and institutional limitations of IGAD's peace and security framework. *Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities*, 18(2), 119–143. https://ejol.aau.edu.et/index.php/EJOSSAH/article/view/9035
49. United Nations & African Union. (2017, April 19). *Joint United Nations–African Union framework for enhanced partnership in peace and security*. https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/jount_un-au_framework_for_an_enhanced_partnership_in_peace_and_security.pdf
50. Amani Africa (2023), *Beyond subsidiarity*.
51. Amani Africa (2023), *Beyond subsidiarity*.
52. Bustamante, M., & de Carvalho, G. (2020, September 3). *The AU and the drive for mediation support* (Africa Report No. 27). Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/the-au-and-the-drive-for-mediation-support
53. Amani Africa (2023), *Beyond subsidiarity*.
54. Tchie (2025), *Converging global norms*.
55. African Union. (2017, May). *Joint press statement of AU, ECOWAS, EU and UN assessment mission to The Gambia* [Press release]. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/joint-press-statement-of-au-ecowas-eu-and-un-assessment-mission-to-the-gambia
56. This is also separate from the bilateral assessments conducted by the P3 member states (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) and other organisations.
57. Authors' interview with a Gambian stakeholder, The Gambia, April 2024.
58. Authors' interview with a Gambian stakeholder, The Gambia, April 2024.
59. See this article for details on the ECOMIG mandates. Available here: https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/03/ecowas-gambia-barrow-jammeh-african-union/ ; and this briefing for more details on the AUTSTG mandate. Available here: https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-au-support-to-member-states-on-security-sector-reform/?print=print
60. [Same as above]
61. Authors' interview with a Gambian stakeholder, The Gambia, April 2024.
62. Authors' interview with a Gambian stakeholder, The Gambia, April 2024.
63. Tchie, A. E. Y. (2025, September). *The role of ad hoc security initiatives and enterprise security arrangements in the protection of civilians in Africa*. International Peace Institute. https://www.ipinst.org/2025/09/ad-hoc-security-initiatives-and-enterprise-security-arrangements-in-poc-in-africa
64. European Commission. (2013). *Central African Republic* (MEMO/13/1162) [Fact sheet]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_13_1162
65. Meyer, A. (2009). Regional conflict management in Central Africa: From FOMUC to MICOPAX. *African Security*, 2(2–3), 158–174. https://doi.org/10.1080/19362200903362075

66. European Commission (2013), *Central African Republic*.
67. African Union. (2013, December 19). *Transfer of authority from MICOPAX to MISCA* [Press release]. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/transfer-of-authority-from-micopax-to-misca
68. United Nations Security Council. (2014, April 10). *Resolution 2149* (2014) (S/RES/2149(2014)). https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2149(2014)
69. Tchie, A. E. Y., Brodtkorb, I. B., & Llorens Zabala, M. (2024). *Unpacking the nexus between stabilization and climate, peace and security* (TfP policy paper). Training for Peace / Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. https://trainingforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/TfP-Policy-Paper_Unpacking-the-Nexus-between-Stabilization-and-Climate-Peace-and-Security.pdf
70. Ceesay, I. (2020). *The Role of the Regional Forces in Gambia and What Their Presence Will Mean in 2021 Elections* (PSCC Policy Paper). Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa. https://pscc.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/publications/PSCC_Policy_Paper_-_The_role_of_the_regional_forces_in_Gambia_and_what_their_presence_will_mean_in_2021_elections.pdf
71. ECOWAS Commission. (2025, June 22). *Sixty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government* [Communiqué]. ECOWAS. https://www.ecowas.int/67th-ecowas-summit-h-e-julius-maada-bio-president-of-sierra-leone-is-the-new-chairman-of-the-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-for-a-one-year-term/
72. ECOWAS. (2012, November 7). *Formalization of ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau* [Press release]. AllAfrica. https://allafrica.com/stories/201211070639.html
73. Okyere, F. (2016). Guinea-Bissau: Ending the perennial political imbroglio. In E. Birikorang, T. Jaye, & F. Okyere (Eds.), *Annual review of peace support operations in Africa*. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre; GlobalSecurity.org. (2017). *ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau* (ECOMIB). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/ecomib.htm
74. ECOWAS later established a follow-on stabilisation presence, the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ESSMGB), to continue supporting security and constitutional order.
75. Delegation of the European Union in Guinea-Bissau. (2021). *Strong Partnership: European Union and ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau. European External Action Service*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strong-partnership-european-union-and-ecowas-guinea-bissau_und_en
76. Southern African Development Community. (2017, December 2). *SADC officially launches the SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho* [Press release]. https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-06/PRESS_RELEASE_2nd_December.pdf; African Union Peace and Security Council. (2018, January 24). *Communiqué of the 748th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the deployment of the SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho* (PSC/PR/COMM(DCCXLVIII)). https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.748.comm.deployment.sapmil.lesotho.24.01.2018.pdf
77. Southern African Development Community (2017), *SADC officially launches the SADC Preventive Mission*.
78. SADC. (2018). *SAPMIL Closes Down in Maseru*. https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sapmil-closes-down-maseru
79. SADC. (2021, November 10). *SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in Brief*. https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim-brief
80. Mandrup, T., Moffat, C., Tchie, A. E. Y., Dzinesa, G. A., Saraiva, R., & Brodtkorb, I. (2025). *The effectiveness of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)* (Joint EPON and TfP study). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. https://trainingforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/EPON_SAMIM_SADC_Mozambique.pdf

81. Mandrup et al. (2025), *The effectiveness of the SADC Mission in Mozambique*.
82. SADC. (2024). *Deployment of the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/deployment-sadc-mission-democratic-republic-congo
83. SADC. (2024), *Deployment of the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*.
84. SADC. (2024). *SAMIDRC Emphasises on the Importance of Humanitarian Coordination During its Operations*. https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/samidrc-emphasises-importance-humanitarian-coordination-during-its-operations
85. Handy, P.-S. (2025). *Anatomy of SADC's Failure in Eastern DRC*. ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/anatomy-of-sadc-s-failure-in-eastern-drc
86. Tchie (2025), *Converging global norms*.
87. de Coning, C., Tchie, A. E. Y., & Grand, A. O. (2022). Ad-hoc security initiatives, an African response to insecurity. *African Security Review*, 31(4), 383–398. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2022.2134810
88. African Union. (2012). *The African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army Enters its Operational Phase*. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-led-regional-cooperation-initiative-for-the-elimination-of-the-lord-s-resistance-army-enters-its-operational-phase
89. African Union (2012), *The African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative*.
90. African Union Peace and Security Council. (2018, September 20). *Communiqué of the 795th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the implementation of the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army* (PSC/COMM.(DCCXCV)). https://africanlii.org/akn/aa-au/doc/communique/pscau/2018/795/eng@2018-09-20
91. de Coning et al. (2022), Ad-hoc security initiatives.
92. Onuoha, F. C., Tchie, A. E. Y., & Llorens Zabala, M. (2023). *A quest to win the hearts and minds: Assessing the effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force* (Joint EPON and TfP study). Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. https://trainingforpeace.org/publications/a-quest-to-win-the-hearts-and-minds-assessing-the-effectiveness-of-the-multinational-joint-task-force/
93. Onuoha et al. (2023), *A quest to win the hearts and minds*.
94. Onuoha et al. (2023), *A quest to win the hearts and minds*.
95. Amani Africa. (2025, June 9). *Update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience* (RS-SRR). Insights on the PSC. https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-the-activities-of-the-mnjtf-and-consideration-of-the-rs-srr/
96. African Union Peace and Security Council. (2025, December 15). *Communiqué of the 1318th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the consideration of the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force against the Boko Haram terrorist group and renewal of its mandate* (PSC/PR/COMM.1318 (2025)). https://peaceau.org/uploads/1318.comm-en.pdf
97. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (n.d.). *Project supporting the G5 Sahel Joint Force with implementation of the human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework*. Retrieved October 24, 2026, from https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africa-region/project-supporting-g5-sahel-joint-force-implementation-human-rights-and-international-humanitarian
98. Edu-Afful et al. (2022), *Shifting from external dependency*.

99. Security Council Report. (2024). *Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force: Closed Consultations*. What's in Blue. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/05/group-of-five-for-the-sahel-joint-force-closed-consultations-2.php
100. Tchie (2025), Converging global norms.
101. Tchie (2025), Converging global norms.
102. Tchie (2025), Converging global norms.
103. Birikorang, E., & Abdallah, M. (2023). T*he Accra Initiative: An old wine in a new bottle?* (KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 51). Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. https://www.kaiptc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/occasional-paper-51.pdf
104. Birikorang & Abdallah (2023), *The Accra Initiative.*
105. Birikorang & Abdallah (2023), *The Accra Initiative*.
106. Burkina Faso, Mali, & Niger. (2023, September 16). *Liptako-Gourma Charter establishing the Alliance of Sahel States*. Transmitted in United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 22 September 2023 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council* (S/2023/695). https://docs.un.org/en/S/2023/695
107. African Union Peace and Security Council. (2025, September 30). *Communiqué of the 1304th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, at ministerial level, on the situation in the Sahel region* (PSC/MIN/COMM.1304 (2025)). https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/f218c88f-cc7f-49b4-8f12-e6fd81e6372a/content
108. APA News. (2025). *AU proposes strategic partnership with Sahel States in Ouagadougo*. https://apanews.net/au-proposes-strategic-partnership-with-sahel-states-in-ouagadougou/
109. Tchie (2025), Converging global norms.
110. Bofin, P. (2025, April 23). *Rwanda in Mozambique: Limits to civilian protection*. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED). https://acleddata.com/report/rwanda-mozambique-limits-civilian-protection
111. Ministry of Defence, Republic of Rwanda. (2021, July). *Rwanda deploys joint force to Mozambique* [Press release]. https://www.mod.gov.rw/docs-media/news-detail/rwanda-deploys-joint-force-to-mozambique-1
112. Tchie (2025), Converging global norms.
113. Congo Research Group & Ebuteli. (2022, October). *Uganda's Operation Shujaa in the DRC: Fighting the ADF or securing economic interests?* https://s42831.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/report-crg-ebuteli-uganda-operation-shujaa-drc-adf-securing-economic-interests-1.pdf
114. Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces. (2026, February 11). *UPDF, FARDC review joint operations against ADF in eastern DRC*. https://www.updf.go.ug/operation-shujaa/updf-fardc-review-joint-operations-against-adf-in-eastern-drc/
115. Llorens Zabala, M. (2023, February 24). Assessing the effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force. *Conflict & Resilience Monitor*. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/assessing-the-effectiveness-of-the-multinational-joint-task-force/
116. Multinational Joint Task Force. (n.d.). *AU support programme*. Retrieved October 24, 2026, from https://mnjtffmm.org/au-support-programme/
117. Llorens Zabala (2023), Assessing the effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force. https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/assessing-the-effectiveness-of-the-multinational-joint-task-force/

118. African Union Peace and Security Council. (2026, May 18). *Communiqué of the 1347th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on an update on the stabilization activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force* (MNJTF) against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin (PSC/PR/COMM.1347.1 (2026)), para. 9. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1347th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-18-may-2026-on-an-update-on-the-stabilization-activities-of-the-multinational-joint-task-force-mnjtf-against-boko-haram-in-the-lake-chad-basin
119. International Crisis Group. (2020, July 7). *What role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in fighting Boko Haram?* (Africa Report No. 291). https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram
120. African Union Peace and Security Council. (2017, April 13). *Communiqué of the 679th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the draft strategic concept of operations of the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel* (PSC/PR/COMM(DCLXXIX)). https://africanlii.org/akn/aa-au/doc/communique/pscau/2017/679/eng@2017-04-13
121. United Nations Security Council. (2017, June 21). *Resolution 2359* (2017) (S/RES/2359(2017)). https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2359(2017)
122. United Nations Security Council. (2017, December 8). *Resolution 2391* (2017) (S/RES/2391(2017)). https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2391(2017); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (n.d.). *The Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force human rights and IHL compliance framework: Key results* [Project fact sheet]. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/Africa/Project-Factsheet-Key-Results-En.pdf
123. International Committee of the Red Cross. (2021). *The Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel): Compliance Framework*. https://ihl-in-action.icrc.org/case-study/the-group-of-five-for-the-sahel-g5-sahel-compliance-framework-2021.
124. Adam, N. & Matongbada, M. (2024, May). *Putting the Protection of Civilians at the Heart of Military Interventions: Lessons Learnt from the G5 Sahel Joint Force* (CIVIV Report). https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/G5-Sahel-Joint-Force-note-analyse-sur-la-PoC-Final.pdf
125. Adam & Matongbada (2024), *Putting the protection of civilians at the heart of military interventions.*
126. African Union Peace and Security Council. (2024, March 4). *Communiqué of the 1203rd meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the consideration of the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo* (DRC) and the deployment of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) (PSC/PR/COMM.1203 (2024)). https://africanlii.org/akn/aa-au/doc/communique/2024-03-04/communique-of-the-1203rd-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-4-march-2024-on-consideration-of-the-situation-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo-drc-and-the-deployment-of-the-southern-african-development-community-mission-in-the-drc-samidrc/eng@2024-03-04
127. United Nations Security Council. (2024, August 9). *Resolution 2746* (2024) (S/RES/2746(2024)). https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2746(2024)
128. Dzinesa, G. A. & Rusero, A. M. (2025). *Another regional intervention falls short in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. IPI Global Observatory. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2025/03/another-regional-intervention-falls-short-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/; Southern African Development Community. (2024, May 27). *SAMIDRC emphasises on the importance of humanitarian coordination during its operations*. https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/samidrc-emphasises-importance-humanitarian-coordination-during-its-operations
129. Dzinesa & Rusero (2025), *Another regional intervention falls short.*

130. Economic Community of Central African States. (2013). *Decision 02/CEEAC/CCEG/13*, Art. 6; United Nations Security Council. (2013). Briefing Record (S/PV.7096).
131. Status of Mission Agreement between the ECOWAS Commission and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, signed in Bissau on 7 November 2012, as reported in ECOWAS (2012), *Formalization of ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau*; United Nations Security Council. (2014, May 12). *Report of the Secretary-General on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau* (S/2014/332). https://docs.un.org/en/S/2014/332
132. African Union Commission & Southern African Development Community Secretariat. (2018, February 9). *AU conducts assessment of the SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho* (SAPMIL). Southern African Development Community. https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/au-conducts-assessment-sadc-preventive-mission-lesotho-sapmil
133. African Union Peace and Security Council. (2022, January 31). *Communiqué of the 1062nd meeting of the PSC on the deployment of the Southern African Development Mission in Mozambique* (SAMIM). African Union Peace and Security Department. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1062nd-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-31-january-2022-on-the-deployment-of-the-southern-african-development-community-mission-in-mozambique-samim; African Union Commission. (2023, November 17). *African Union hands over military equipment to SADC's SAMIM in Mozambique*. https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/43342-pr-African_Union_Hands_Over_Military_Equipment_to_SADCs_SAMIM_in_Mozambique_.pdf
134. International Committee of the Red Cross. (2023, September 27). *Mozambique: communities return to their areas of origin with urgent basic needs*. https://www.icrc.org/en/Mozambique-communities-return-to-their-areas-of-origin-with-urgent-basic-needs
135. ACLED. (2024, May 2). *SADC Mission in Mozambique* (SAMIM). https://acleddata.com/report/sadc-mission-mozambique-samim
136. ACLED. (2021, October 5). *Cabo Ligado weekly: 27 September-2 October 2021*. https://acleddata.com/update/cabo-ligado-weekly-27-september-3-october-2021; Human Rights Watch. (2024). *World Report 2024: Mozambique*. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/mozambique
137. African Union. (2025). *The African Union-Led Regional Task Force for the Elimination of the LRA*. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-led-regional-task-force-for-the-elimination-of-the-lra-1
138. United Nations Security Council. (2012, June 25). *Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and on the Lord's Resistance Army-affected areas* (S/2012/481) [containing the United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army]. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2012/481
139. Shepherd, B., Davis, L., & Jowell, M. (2015, May). *In new light: Protection of civilians, the Lord's Resistance Army and the African Union Regional Task Force*. Conciliation Resources. https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/InNewLight_AURTF%20and%20POC_May2015.pdf
140. Shepherd et al. (2015), *In new light*.
141. African Union Peace and Security Department. (2024). *Press Release: AU Convenes Nouakchott Process Meeting to Enhance Coordination, Information Sharing and Joint Operations Against Terrorism in the Sahel-Sahara Region*. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/press-release-au-convenes-nouakchott-process-meeting-to-enhance-coordination-information-sharing-and-joint-operations-against-terrorism-in-the-sahel-sahara-region

142. African Union Peace and Security Department. (2024). *Press Release: African Union and National Counter Terrorism Centre of Nigeria Sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Collaborative Counterterrorism Efforts*. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/press-release-african-union-and-national-counter-terrorism-centre-of-nigeria-sign-a-memorandum-of-understanding-on-collaborative-counterterrorism-efforts
143. United Nations Development Programme Ghana. (2024). *Japan and UNDP Supports Capacity Building for Accra Initiative to Counter Terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel*. https://www.undp.org/ghana/press-releases/japan-and-undp-supports-capacity-building-accra-initiative-counter-terrorism-west-africa-and-sahel
144. Twumwaa, J. (2025). *Ghana, UNOWAS partner to revitalize Accra Initiative*. MordenGhana. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1393213/ghana-unowas-partner-to-revitalize-accra-initiati.html
145. Tchie (2025), *The role of ad hoc security initiatives and enterprise security arrangements.*
146. Birikorang & Abdallah (2023), *The Accra Initiative*.
147. Birikorang & Abdallah (2023), *The Accra Initiative*.
148. West African Voice Network. (2026). *African Union Signals New Approach Toward Alliance of Sahel States.* https://www.wavn.org/african-union-signals-new-approach-toward-alliance-of-sahel-states/
149. Sallama, M. B. (2026). How the Alliance of Sahel States is financing itself from outside the region and what has become of ECOWAS. *Modern Ghana*. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1515250/how-the-alliance-of-sahel-states-is-financing-itse.html
150. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2026). *Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger: Humanitarian Overview*. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/burkina-faso/burkina-faso-mali-and-western-niger-humanitarian-overview-29-april-2026
151. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2026). *Burkina Faso: UN Human Rights to shut down country office.* https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/07/burkina-faso-un-human-rights-shut-down-country-office; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2026). *Burkina Faso: Türk calls on authorities to halt rapid closure of civic space*. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/burkina-faso-turk-calls-authorities-halt-rapid-closure-civic-space
152. Human Rights Watch. (2026, July 203). *Niger: 3 Years of Military Rule Deepens Human Rights Crisis*. https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/23/niger-3-years-of-military-rule-deepens-human-rights-crisis
153. United Nations Security Council. (2023, June 30). *Resolution 2690* (2023) (S/RES/2690). https://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2690/
154. Burkina Faso, Mali, & Niger (2023), *Liptako-Gourma Charter, preamble*.
155. Military Africa. (2025, December 22). *Sahel juntas (AES) launched Unified Force*. https://www.military.africa/2025/12/aes-launches-unified-force/
156. Tchie (2025), *Converging global norms*.
157. United Nations Security Council. (2022, June 14). *Letter dated 10 June 2022 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council* (S/2022/479), paras. 20–22. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2022/479
158. United Nations Security Council. (2008). *Resolution 1807 (2008*) S/RES/1807 (2008).; United Nations Security Council. (2016). *Resolution 2293 (2016)* S/RES/2293 (2016); United Nations Security Council. (2021). *Resolution 2582 (2021)* S/RES/2582 (2021).

159. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (n.d.). *United Nations Joint Human Rights Office* (UNJHRO). https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/CD/ADF_EN.pdf
160. United Nations Security Council. (2025). *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (S/2025/446); United Nations Secretary-General. (2022). *UN Secretary-General Report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (S/2024/479).
161. The New Times. (2021, July). *AU boss: Rwanda's deployment to Mozambique an act of African solidarity.* https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/au-boss-rwandas-deployment-mozambique-act-african-solidarity, (reporting a post by Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, on X [formerly Twitter]).
162. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2026, February). *Mozambique: Humanitarian access snapshot – Northern provinces* (Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Nampula). https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/mozambique/mozambique-humanitarian-access-snapshot-northern-provinces-cabo-delgado-niassa-nampula-february-2026-enpt
163. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2015). *The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians*. https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/the-kigali-principles-on-the-protection-of-civilians/: Rwanda Ministry of Defence. (2021). *Rwanda Deploys Joint Force to Mozambique*. https://www.mod.gov.rw/docs-media/news-detail/rwanda-deploys-joint-force-to-mozambique-1
164. Bofin (2025), *Rwanda in Mozambique*.
165. Bofin (2025), *Rwanda in Mozambique*.
166. Tchie, A. E. Y., & Kumalo, L. (2023). Transferring policy: The African Union's protection of civilians policy in peacekeeping missions in Somalia and South Sudan. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 23*(1), 63–90. https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/255574
167. Adam & Matongbada (2024), *Putting the protection of civilians at the heart of military interventions*.
168. de Coning, C., & Tchie, A. E. Y. (2023). *Enhancing the effectiveness of African-led peace support operations through an adaptive stabilisation approach*. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 26(4), 266–292. https://doi.org/10.1163/18754112-26040001



Building capacity for the protection of civilians in African-led Peace Support Operations:

AU–UN cooperation beyond United Nations Security Council resolution 2719

Celebrating 30 years of the Training for Peace programme

This programme is funded by:

THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ACCORD
THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

ISS INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

NUPI Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

The Training for Peace Programme is based on a unique North-South-South cooperation. The partner institutions are the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).