Principles of International Police Command

Background Paper for the SGF Thematic Meeting on Police Command¹

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Background

A well-developed common platform of guidelines on police command in international peace operations should be important not only to successful mandate delivery, but also for maintaining the confidence of countries that contribute police to UN peace operations. This paper is written with the intention to provide some food-for-thought and support a discussion on key principles for international police command.

In the past twenty years, Rule of Law, Policing and Police Reform have become integral to international peace operations. Police officers were first involved in the UN operation in Congo-Kinshasa (1960–64), and then in maintaining peace on Cyprus before its de facto partition (1964–74).⁵ At the end of the Cold War, UN Police (UNPOL) once again began to play significant roles in operations intended to implement agreements ending civil wars or colonial administrations. From the mid-1990s to the present, UN policing mandates have become more complex, and operational environments have become less stable. At the turn of the century, UN operations began to deploy “formed police units” (FPUs) to support public order in unstable areas of operation, and from roughly 2010 onward, these armed units have contained about just over half of all UN Police deployed in peace operations. As its operational environment has hardened over time, so has UNPOL’s “shell.” Its tasks have also become more complex, evolving from observing and reporting to advising and rebuilding host-state police, while conducting joint operations with them and with UN military contingents, and on occasion having full policing and other law enforcement authority – initially in East Timor and Kosovo, most recently but with a limited focus in Central African Republic.⁶ The goal in all cases is to establish a

¹ The background paper has been prepared for the Thematic Meeting on Police Command held in South Africa 21-23 October 2014 hosted by United Nations DPKO/Police Division together with the Institute for Security Studies and the Swedish National Police, as part of the process to develop a Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping. The views in the paper represent those of the authors and not necessarily the organizations they represent.

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⁶ The European Union’s mission, EULEX, which took over most police in Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) in late 2008, also has executive policing authority.
legitimate and democratic policing capacity that is “representative of and responsive and accountable to the community it serves.”

Effective police operations with complex mandates in difficult political and security environments require effective leadership and clear command and control concepts and structures. This paper first examines the evolution of recent UN thinking and policy development on issues related to police command, lays out basic principles for successful command, addresses significant challenges to implementation of policing mandates in multinational mission settings and the role of command in meeting those challenges, and concludes with some observations intended to promote/provoke discussion at the thematic meeting itself.

What is meant by Command?

There is not one recognised definition of command and rarely in policing is the term command used alone. More often the terminology, used in both policing and military context is ‘command and control’, referring to a number of different elements, which when successfully brought together produces effective action. Command and control is often considered as being both the authority and capability of an organisation to direct the actions of its personnel and resources to an identified aim. It is questionable whether it is possible to command without the elements considered to make up control being in place.

The command element can refer to the human or people aspect - leadership, authority, and decision-makers. The Command or the Commanders are those with the identified skills and experience who are making the decisions, based on communication and information generally provided by others. The control element is the ‘how and with what commanders execute command’ – the intelligence/information, feedback, resources, management, doctrine and structures.\(^7\) Commanders are unable to make considered decisions and co-ordinate actions without situational awareness, information and a structure, which provides the tools and resources with which to respond.

Traditionally, ‘command and control’ has been viewed as operating in one direction: from the top of the organization down-wards. Commanders ‘impose control’ on those under their command and are ‘in control’ of their subordinates. History tells us this approach can produce effect, however, the modern view of command and control is increasingly moving towards a more transformational, multidirectional exercise of leadership, which involves team input, devolved responsibilities and accountability, and is based on information and continuous feedback. Feedback can come in many forms and from different directions: the communication of vision, strategic and operational guidance; intelligence about how a public order situation or criminality in an area is developing; impact of operational delivery; or information about the status of units tasked with certain responsibilities. Feedback can tell us the difference between the initial objective and the situation as it exists allowing the receiving Commander to monitor, adjust and modify command actions as needed.

The proper purpose of command and control is not to be ‘in control’ but to provide the necessary parameters and guidance in an often uncertain, disorderly, often time-competitive environment, without stifling the initiative of subordinates. Depending on the circumstances there may be a requirement to adopt different command or leadership methods at different stages and times during operations or events. The good commander cannot be overly rigid and should have the experience and capability to manoeuvre across the command and control spectrum to gain the best results.

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\(^8\) Control is used in a slightly different meaning in the DPKO-DFS Policy on Authority, Command and Control. In the policy it indicates a lower hierarchical level of command in relation to a higher level, where command seems to mean to assign tasks. Control is often used in the meaning to direct forces. (see textbox 1 and compare paras 9, 10, 11, 54)
The three tiers of Command – strategic, operational and tactical - are common to police services globally and used in most international peace operations. Within the international context ‘strategic’ is generally considered the political level and guidance is provided from an organisational HQ located outside the Mission area. Operational and tactical command is considered the responsibility of the mission. Regional organizations sometimes place the operational command at HQ level in the capital of the organization.

The 2014 UN Policy on Police defines Command for police peacekeeping as

an element ensuring overall accountability, providing strategic planning and vision and engaging in monitoring and evaluation. Other aspects of the Command function include project management and oversight, gender and environmental mainstreaming, human rights integration into planning and operations, public affairs and outreach, community engagement and international police co-operation.  

The DPKO/DFS Policy on Authority, Command and Control refers to Command as

The authority vested in a Military leader/ Police Commander for the direction, coordination and control of military and police forces/ personnel. Command has a legal status and denotes functional and knowledgeable exercise of military/ police authority to attain military/ police objectives or goals. 

Command is in turn embedded in United Nations Operational Authority, a definition which is worth quoting at some length, because it highlights many of the constraints under which UN field missions operate with their borrowed police and military forces. It is,

the authority transferred by the member states to the United Nations to use the operational capabilities of their national military contingents, units, Formed Police Units and/or military and police personnel to undertake mandated missions and tasks. Operational authority over such forces and personnel is vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. “United Nations Operational Authority” involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of (1) a specific mandate of the Security Council; (2) an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent would require the contributing country to provide adequate prior notification; and (3) a specific geographic area (the mission area as a whole).

Significantly, what Operational Authority does not confer upon the United Nations is any significant ability to discipline the forces put at its disposal. Thus, Operational Authority

does not include any responsibility for certain personnel matters of individual members of military contingents and Formed Police Units, such as pay, allowances, and promotions etc. These functions remain a national responsibility. In regard to disciplinary matters, while the discipline of military personnel remains the responsibility of the troop contributing countries the United Nations may take administrative steps for misconduct, including repatriation of military contingent members and staff officers (reference the revised model Memorandum of Understanding, A/61/19 part III). As regards the Experts on Mission, including United Nations police officers and military observers, the United Nations would take administrative actions and

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11 DPKO-DFS, Policy - Authority, Command and Control, para. 7.
disciplinary measures in accordance with the UN Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers…

UN Operational Authority lacks key disciplinary leverage but this is a common – even a defining – deficit of multinational military (and police) arrangements, which depend on national delegations of forces. Because Member States do retain Administrative Control over their nationally contributed units or personnel, national caveats on their employment or location may limit the effective operational authority of mission leadership and result in long-distance negotiations during dangerous or fast-moving situations in the mission area. Thus, while the Policy on Authority, Command and Control stipulates that, “Police personnel assigned to serve under UN operational control shall not act on national direction or instructions if those instructions may result in actions contrary to UN policies or adversely affect implementation of the mission's mandate,” the Policy goes on to lay out procedures for resolving just such mission-contingent differences:

In the event a national contingent commander is unable to satisfactorily resolve an important police employment issue within the mission (i.e. with the Head of Police Component - HOPC and then the Head of Mission - HOM) then the officer may submit the issue to the contributing Member State for consideration, which may consequently involve national discussions with the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping

Text Box 1

Other United Nations Elements of Command and Control

9. United Nations Operational Control. The authority granted to a Military Commander in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation to direct forces assigned so that the Commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign Tactical Command or Control of those units/personnel. Operational Control includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub units of a contingent, as required by operational necessities, within the mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the Contingent Commander and as approved by the United Nations Headquarters. For operational control of Police components refer to para 54 and 55 of this policy.

[54. The HOPC [Head of Police Component] exercises operational control over personnel of the police component of the peacekeeping operation. Such control allows the HOPC to assign separate tasks to all individual personnel, units and sub-units within the police component, as required, within the mission area of responsibility. The HOPC may delegate such responsibility to the appropriate subordinate levels.

55. Police officers assigned by the HOPC to serve in integrated and joint offices, or to other offices within the mission, shall be responsible to, and report to, those heads of offices.]

10. United Nations Tactical Command. The authority delegated to a military or police commander in a United Nations Peacekeeping operation to assign tasks to forces under their command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

11. United Nations Tactical Control. The detailed and local direction and control of movement, or manoeuvre, necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessities the Head of Military Component (HOMC) and Head of Police Component (HOPC) may delegate the Tactical Control of assigned military forces/ police personnel to the subordinate sector and/or unit commanders.

12. Administrative Control. The authority over subordinate or other organizations within national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Administrative Control is a national responsibility given to the National Contingent Commander (NCC) in peacekeeping operations.


12 DPKO-DFS, Policy - Authority, Command and Control, para. 7.
13 NATO’s Glossary of Terms cautions, for example, that “The term ‘command’ as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agency, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), AAP-06, edition 2014.
(USG), the Head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), through appropriate DPKO staff. The HOPC, through the HOM, may raise the issue to USG DPKO.  

**Command Situations**

Police commanders in both national and international contexts must be able to respond to varying situations and their attendant responsibilities. These situations can generally be clustered under four headings.  

- **Normality or Steady State** - describes everyday responsibilities and activities. In mission settings may include, inter alia, providing advice on policing operations, crime investigations, strategic planning, organisational management, community engagement and outreach, human rights, gender mainstreaming, human resource and administration, project management, strengthening governance, accountability, monitoring and evaluation.

- **Rising Tide** — includes unplanned incidents or events that develop out of steady state into an emergency or major incident or operation. These incidents may last for some time and, as the situation escalates, may require transition to a more experienced-level Commander or the support of mission military units.

- **Pre-planned Operations**- time scales will vary but best described as situations where there is considerable information or knowledge about an anticipated event or incident and the time to plan a response to it ahead of time.

- **Spontaneous Incidents** —An event that occurs with little to no-warning and little time to plan a response.

Although specific circumstances and response requirements will vary across incidents, basic principles of police command will very likely remain the same. If these principles can be identified, developed and then practised within an organisation, it should be able to increase its capacity to deal with crisis, uncertainty and events, in whatever form.

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14 DPKO-DFS, Policy - Authority, Command and Control, para. 57.
15 The specific terminology describing these situations will vary across Member States. The following categories have been adopted for convenience from the United Kingdom’s College of Policing, Command and control definitions and procedures, 2013. Internet, https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/operations/command-and-control/definitions and procedures. Accessed 15 September 2014.
16 DPKO-DFS, Policy - Authority, Command and Control, deals with police-military cooperation in para 100.

100.1 *Situations of Public Disorder of a Non-military Nature* (no sustained use of firearms or military weaponry). “In such circumstances, the FPUs/other constituted body of police personnel should have primacy in addressing such situations in support of or in cooperation with national law enforcement agencies, as applicable. The Head of Police Component or the FPU Commander may request personnel of the military component and/ or other security personnel of the mission to perform specific missions or tasks. In these situations, the senior most UN Police Officer or FPU Commander in location (at the site of incident) will exercise overall command.

100.2 *Situations of Public disorder of Military Nature* (generally refers to situations where there is sustained use of firearms or military weaponry). “In such circumstances units of the military component would have primacy in addressing such situations in support of or ‘in cooperation with relevant national agencies as applicable. The Head of the Military Component or Sector/ Unit Commander may request FPU/ constituted body of police personnel and/ or other security personnel to perform specific missions or tasks. In these situations, the senior most Military Commander in location (at the site of incident) will exercise overall command.”

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Principles for Successful Command

Successful police command in peace operations demands the most resilient and experienced leaders, however as alluded to earlier competing demands and political balance and sensitivities means this is not always attainable. It is important therefore to consider the police command role and requirements as a ‘whole’ and to not only recruit the best possible police leaders, but to ensure he/she has the ability, capabilities and resources to effectively command in this complex environment.

The list below is not exhaustive, but the report authors consider the key principles for successful police command in international environment should include the following:

Leadership

“Leadership is probably peacekeepers most important success factor”

-- David Haeri, Director DPET, DPKO, at IAPTC 2014

Given the aforementioned challenges and complexities it is essential that senior police commanders are operationally competent, knowledgeable and possess recognized good leadership skills. However, it is not enough for leaders just to have the required knowledge and skills – they will only succeed when they effectively apply those skills and what they know. What they actually do and perhaps more importantly, how they do it, will depend on their ability to influence others and what the outcome will look like. The ability to involve, influence and develop others through providing direction, guidance, support and motivation are increasingly seen as critical skills of effective leadership and without this most other management skills will not work. This is particularly when working within multicultural and multidimensional environments, where a more democratic, inclusive style is more likely to bring more success than a culture based on ‘top down’ autocratic leadership.

The Police Commander should be able to identify when to take control or give direction and support, without stifling staff initiative. He/she must be seen by staff as resilient, actively leading, listening, taking feedback and being open to information and suggestions but also as decisive when dealing with problems. Importantly they should be concerned with people’s welfare and not just how well they perform their duties. The good commander needs to create a positive and transparent culture within the Mission, which helps to foster trust and mutual understanding. Providing he/she is a person of integrity and fairness in routine and steady state situations, staff will respect and better comply with orders and command in crisis situations. This kind of leadership loyalty is not automatic and because of time constraints must be developed quickly – not least in a peace operation. This is not easy given the quick staff rotations but even the most reluctant team member will extend themselves for a commander if they trust his or her judgment and commitment to the job and believe their individual role and effort is valued.

People Resources

Successful command requires the right people and resources. The staff, their actions and the information and feedback from mission or operational personnel are critical to what the Commander bases his/her decisions and judgements and how resources are deployed. The competence of staff in key positions can be the difference between success and failure, especially in situations requiring urgent complex and coordinated decisions. Organizations typically facing this type of challenges (national police, rescue services, military) most often have key staff with similar training and professional careers. This supports shared understanding and allows more intuitive communication in a given situation, which often leads to effective decision making and execution. A police component in an international peace operation does not have this benefit and would need to compensate by more careful recruitment, selection and training of those officers that are in key command and control positions. It also requires more of commanders to ensure that the specific skills and experience of
subordinate commanders and/or advisers are utilised instead of put to waste. More critical and robust assessment of needs should better inform planning and identification of the skill-sets required for missions. The recognition of the growing complexity of the policing roles in missions requires greater consideration in the planning, recruitment, pre-deployment and selection processes. This would assist contributing countries better select and prepare staff for missions and specific post requirements.

**Devolved responsibility and accountability**

Planning, devolved responsibility, performance management and accountability processes are critical to successful command. These practices/systems are not currently familiar to all national policing models, nor entirely present in international peace operations. The majority of these skills can be developed and/or brought in to a mission, but unless command responsibility in particular is devolved ‘from the centre,’ allowing police commanders to take decisions based on local intelligence and information, the operation is unlikely to be successful. The devolution of responsibility is critical at all levels, strategic, operational and tactical. This is not to say there should not be guidance and parameters, more that commanders need to be given the freedom and flexibility to make decisions, task actions, move and co-ordinate resources and effort, based on local and quick time information, without awaiting lengthy and bureaucratic procedures to be worked through at the HQ/centre level.

Additional freedoms in decision-making should not be introduced without accountability mechanisms being established. Such measures allow performance to be reviewed and tracked; ‘bottom up and top down’ lessons learned and, where appropriate, timely modification of actions taken. Internal organisational management meeting and co-ordination structures need to be built in to mission day-to-day business, allowing command and managers to check up on task delivery and performance. The introduction of additional and accountable systems and processes should not detract from delivering the ‘task in hand’ or become an administrative burden, but an opportunity to develop more flexible and responsive service.

**Identifiable command structure**

The identification of a command structure and clarity of roles and responsibilities are important in controlling and delivering successful operations. The command structure commonly used by police and military globally and in the UN, is a three level or tiered approach – strategic, tactical and operational. When implemented effectively it allows decisions to be communicated and information disseminated to the right people at the right time and can include other stakeholders.

The importance of a well-functioning command structure within the police component is never as important as when the organization is expected to deal with rapidly developing serious security situations. Unless police and other staff in key functions related to command are trained, capable and well-aware of their respective responsibilities, police command will face difficulties in delivering the necessary and effective police activities.

**Organisational management and planning capabilities**

Given the increased complexities of peace operations and the demand for performance management data, missions must have the capability to develop and implement operational and organisational management plans and processes – both within the mission and in support of host policing reforms. The concept of operational and event planning is common to most police personnel, however the ability to develop and importantly program manage, monitor more detailed strategic, operational and organisational plans, measurements and reports less so.

While there is a need for specialist skills in this area it is critical that the Police Commander fully understands this area of business. He/she is responsible for developing, overseeing and managing the delivery of mission plans and when holding others to account must have the ability to check and ‘probe’ the operational feedback
being provided. Unlike the national (home) context there is not likely to be significant expertise within the mission for this particular function and Commanders may not always have known, trusted and experienced staff ensuring accuracy of task performance information.

Integrating missions are likely to require the preparation and conduct of joint operations with military components. The military typically have a well-developed capability for planning, which makes it more important that the police component designates capable staff to this task. If not, there is risk that the military will take and retain the lead in any joint operation, even though the situation would otherwise mandate that the police be in lead (see note 11).

**Information/Intelligence**

In a command and control perspective information is used for two main purposes: create situational awareness and direct and coordinate actions in the execution of a decision. Information is normally time sensitive as situations can change, meaning that information can be valuable one moment but misleading the next. Without information providing situational awareness a commander cannot make sound decisions. Without information that conveys understanding of concept and intent, subordinates cannot take proper actions. The key is not the amount of information, but the right elements of information. It has to be available when needed and in a useful form, which improve the commander’s awareness of the situation and ability to act.

There are many misconceptions surrounding the word intelligence. If it is accepted that police commanders need information to make sound decisions, it must also be accepted that this information should be of a certain quality to be of use. Intelligence is about adding quality to raw data by processing and analysing it so it becomes more useful in decision-making.

It is recognised that every national police organization relies on intelligence to be able to provide meaningful police services. It is realistic therefore to consider that to be effective and conduct mission activities in peace operations require intelligence gathering and analytical capability and that it must be included when reforming/building Host-State police services. Commanders are required to develop risk strategies and contingency plans and should have the tools in place to inform these processes.

**Communication**

Senior leaders, including the Police Commander, within peace operations have a responsibility to ensure internal and external communication channels and mechanisms within a Mission are established and effective and individually should have personal communication and media handling skills. There is a tendency to consider communication as being media/press releases when in fact it is much wider and should include messages for host government/police and public, other international stakeholders, mission staff and HQ.

Communications should generally be understood as the method or means to convey information from one person or place to another. The purpose is to improve understanding.

If the police component in a peace operation is unclear in terms of objectives, philosophy and doctrine, and in addition has staff members from a multitude of Member States with little or no common education and training, it will pose a communication challenge for any police commander. This problem is typically addressed in peace operations by ensuring a redundancy in information. Ideally, if people in key functions in the police components instead could have more shared experiences and training as well as a common outlook – not to mention common language – communication could be more implicit, reducing time spent drafting and relaying messages. It would help maximizing information content while minimizing flow of data, thereby making the information less vulnerable to disruption of communication. This can be a challenge for an organization that relies on professionals with diverse professional background and limited commonality in experience and training. With improved doctrine and efforts to ensure widespread understanding of guidelines, it would be possible to compensate to an extent for lack of shared experience and training. Well-developed guidelines linked to training thus are likely to have a positive impact also on communications.
Partnerships

Successful mandate delivery demands a successful partnership approach. Immediately in joining a mission the Police Commander must build relationships with the host government/police, international and national actors, including in-country Member States and must encourage partnership building across all levels of the organization. Good working relationships and informal and formalized partnerships are essential to ensure cooperation and collaboration and sustained buy-in and ownership of capacity building outcomes and reforms.

Inevitably in peace operations critical and sensitive situations involving the mission, mission staff and host counterparts will occur. These will be much easier resolved if sound and professional relationships and partnerships have already been established.

Negotiation and influencing skills

Closely linked to partnerships and communication is the art of negotiation and influencing. Police Officers appointed to peace operations command roles are expected to come with already developed leadership and communication skills. However, two of the most critical requirements, but not always exercised in national roles, are the ability to negotiate and influence. Throughout the different stages of peace operations the Police Commanders will find they have to spend a considerable amount of their time building relationships and negotiating on areas such as mandates, reform plans, budgets, projects and resource requirements and endeavouring to influence often reluctant host governments/police, mission counterparts and other stakeholders. The outcomes of these negotiations may have a political impact, or directly affect the success of the mission. Whilst it can be said that we subconsciously use negotiation and influencing skills on a daily basis, the criticality of the peace operations environment demands high skill levels in these areas.

Doctrine, Training/Exercising

“Undoubtedly the emergency plans and exercises that had been put in place during the preceding months and years contributed to what was, in many respects, an outstanding response.”


The establishment of common strategic approaches and clear standards and doctrine for command in police peacekeeping is necessary to support commanders at all levels within international peace operations. This paper contributes towards a concerted effort now being made to develop such doctrine; however, this is only the beginning. Investment in consistent and relevant training and exercising will be required to ensure a common understanding, particularly of roles and responsibilities when multiple organisations or stakeholders are engaged or new staff join the organisation.

Decision Making/Problem Solving

“Effective decision making is a defined process that helps identify and select the best action among several alternative options based on a goal and an evaluation of a possible consequence.”

-- International Peace Institute (IPI), Field Officer Handbook.

Police Commanders are required to make judgements under pressure and often split-second decisions, the outcome of which is likely to impact significantly politically and directly or indirectly on others, inside and out of the Mission. He/she needs to have the ability to quickly and accurately assimilate what can be vague, often rushed, confused, and conflicting information from others, evaluate actions and translate complex plans and strategies into specific, focused directives.

A systematic process or approach is necessary to guide and assist Commanders to make sound, ethical and considered decisions. Police Services globally use a range of decision-making models; however most infer a simple cyclical approach, which forces the user to ensure a constant check of decisions made. Organisational
values will differ but in the UN context decision makers should adhere to the values and principles expressed in the Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions. Time does not always allow commanders to segregate thinking and consciously go through every step. In fast-moving incidents the main priority is to keep in mind the over-arching mission values and principles. (See Text Box 2.)

A sound decision making approach should include the following six steps and considerations.

1. **Information and Intelligence:** Consult. Consider the information and intelligence available. Where has it come from? How good is the source? Do you need to task out to gain further intelligence?

2. **Identify what needs to be achieved and assess threat and risk**—What is the goal/what needs to be done? What is threat and what is the risk? (Consideration of risks - Justifiable, Accountable, Proportionate, Authorised, Necessary)

3. **Consider Mission mandate, legislation, policies and procedures**—What are the Mission’s legal

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**Text Box 2:**

### D5. Fundamental principles of international police peacekeeping

30. The delineation of core United Nations police functions in peacekeeping operations and special political missions and the identification of operational tasks shall be guided by the following fundamental principles:


32. United Nations police shall provide support that is gender-responsive and pays particular attention to the needs of vulnerable groups.

33. United Nations police shall oppose corruption in all its forms.

34. United Nations police shall make every effort to operate in an environmentally conscious manner.

35. United Nations police shall always conduct a thorough and standardised assessment of the host State situation as a basis for mandate implementation.

36. In the planning process, United Nations police shall engage with partners in the United Nations system and Member States in an effort to assist in making mandates as clear, credible and achievable as possible.

37. United Nations police core functions shall be implemented within a wider rule of law and security sector reform context.

38. United Nations police shall make every effort to identify and recruit the specialised capacities to fulfil mandates.

39. United Nations police shall ensure that planned support to capacity development is demand-driven and appropriate in relation to host State needs.

40. United Nations police shall recognise the political context of their work.

41. United Nations police shall respect host State ownership and seek broad buy-in.

42. United Nations police shall plan activities with a focus on sustainability from the outset.

43. United Nations police shall evaluate delivery on mandated tasks regularly.

44. United Nations police shall cultivate partnerships.

framework, mandate and operating parameters? Consider the implications of stepping outside of those. Consider Human Rights implications?

4. **Identify Options and alternatives (contingencies).** Consult/ask questions and develop ideas. Identify good practices. Problem Solve difficulties and consider all realistic and achievable options available.

5. **Decide and Implement decision/Take Action:** Make and implement the decision. Ensure the decision is clearly articulated to others. Keep a log of decision-making process.

6. **Evaluate effect /Review.** Conduct evaluation/review action taken/ if necessary re-consider /change course of action.

![Diagram of decision making model for UNPOL](Source: authors, based on the OODA-loop by Stephen P. Boyd. Similar models are used in many police organizations worldwide)

**Challenges to Command**

“The UN is unlike many contemporary national police services, ... having to work and respond in often complex but weak ... political, environment, social, technological, economic, and legal contexts; and in conflict or post-conflict situations. This is not the norm for many police officers from police contributing countries.”

-- Greg Hinds, Police Commissioner, UNMIL

It cannot be held that a good national police commander will automatically be successful when faced with the challenges of command within international peace operations. Challenges faced at national level are significant, but in the unique multifaceted and multidimensional environment of international peacekeeping operations these are magnified. A representative but by no means exhaustive list of these challenges includes issues of hierarchy, complexity, intelligence gaps, personnel quality, and historical lack of doctrine.

**The Hierarchy of Command – Missions/Operations vs. Higher Strategic Headquarters.**

The complexities of command hierarchy and reporting lines normally found in national operations are further compounded in the international context where most of the strategic and political level command is centralised –i.e. UN through the Security Council/Secretary General in New York and in the EU, the Political and Security Committee/EEAS Command in Brussels. In addition Member States, whilst vesting authority for operational control of their staff and resources to organisations such as the UN or EU, maintain a role in their selection, training and conduct processes. As noted, direct contact with Member State capitals continues when staff are in the Mission, sustaining mixed signals in terms of reporting and guidance and command loyalty.
Complexity of Integrated Missions

Peace operations are political engagements, wider than just a military or police operation, and extend into groups of actors working in the mission area: the host country (leadership, people, spoilers), neighbouring states (ditto), regional and international organizations, and interested Member states, including those States contributing troops and police. An operation is mandate dependent but recent peace operations are integrated missions with military, police and civilian components, endeavoring to meet a coherent system wide approach together with other partners (donor states, multilateral organizations, and NGOs).

The Police Commander/HOPC has a number of command responsibilities:

- **Up** – to SRSG/HoM/UN–DPKO, EU CivOpsCdr;
- **Outwards** (1) – to the host government and host police and public;
- **Outwards** (2) – to other Mission components and relevant Stakeholders; and
- **Down** – to Police and other Mission staff.

Each of these stakeholder groups requires specific communication/ consideration and management both in delivering normal mission responsibilities and operational incidents. Geographical, security and communication difficulties add to this challenge.

**Conducting joint operations with the military and other civilian components of the mission.**

‘The ability to maintain separate profiles while establishing interoperability and strong functional relationships between police officers and military peacekeepers is a difficult balance but is critical to the success of policing in peacekeeping operations.’


Having civilian, police and military components within the same mission is increasingly common but there remain different cultures and a continuing lack of understanding of the roles and responsibilities of police in particular that colours other components’ expectations, and of FPUs in particular, where a mission may have a non-executive mandate but UNPOL are providing operational support to host-state police. It is of particular importance that the host-state police, with appropriate support from the international police, take a lead in dealing with local security situations that are non-military in nature.17 Within UN integrated missions the military are responsible for the overall security situation and the Force Commander and Police Commissioner (PC)/Senior Police Adviser (SPA) are co-equals in the senior management team led by the SRSG. In formal UN hierarchy the Force Commander is considered a more senior person always reporting directly to the SRSG, which is not always the case with the PC. The transition of responsibilities between military personnel is well structured and rehearsed, however less so when both military and police or other civilian elements are engaged

17 “Maintaining public order is the domain of the police and other law enforcement agencies…” (International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Stockholm 2010, p 78); “While the maintenance of public order is a responsibility of the host-state police, situations may require the (UN) police component through its FPUs to act independently or in support of the host-state police on order to carry out the mission’s mandate.” (Ibid, p 81)
in joint operations. Whilst increasingly being developed, Missions have limited resource and budget capabilities for ‘in house’ joint training.

**Host-State laws and norms.**

Recognising and operating within host-state laws, procedures and interim laws/measures in an environment where society does not always trust the justice system/police as a legitimate organ of the State is a challenge for peace operations. This is particularly true where there is mistrust due to past and recent human rights abuses and where there are cultural differences and norms in relation to gender and corruption within State organisations. Simultaneously negotiating police reforms and supporting the conduct of ongoing operations can test the most seasoned of police commanders.

**Coordinating both operational incidents and capacity-building activities with host-state government and police.**

The very nature of peace operations means that few missions have the luxury of supporting police reforms within a benign environment. Security incidents occur with little warning and may be on a scale that requires the full attention of the police component, possibly with military support. HOPCs are normally expected to support the development of host police reforms at the same time as supporting host police operations in what can be extremely volatile and unstable environments and with rising concerns regarding transnational crime and terrorism. In addition there are internal mission command measures to attend to. Added together these can create an unhealthy competition for already stretched mission resources, many of who do not have the skillset or flexibility to move between all of these demands. A high level of command skill and judgment is necessary to ensure resources are best deployed within mandate ‘parameters’ and in accordance with the values of the mission.

Frustrations with the pace and manner of international police reform, lack of host ‘buy-in’, unstable and overwhelmed host governments, the multiplicity of international actors and constant changes of senior mission personnel can all lead to difficult working relationships between the host state and mission personnel. The Police Commander plays a key role in establishing and sustaining relationships within this at times fraught environment.

**Lack of intelligence processes and information systems.**

As in many other aspects of international policing activity, crime intelligence is both an operational command necessity – linking to mission situational awareness – and a capacity building activity – supporting the development of professional policing in developing intelligence capabilities in the host country. However, the use of “intelligence” within peace operations is fraught with misconceptions and concerns and as a result few missions are fully supported in this important area. Challenges include: contributing Member States’ reluctance to support mission capabilities, preferring instead to protect their own intelligence gathering activities; lack of capability to process and analyse information; intelligence gathering being seen as the responsibility of the military component; Mission/Police Advisers being reluctant to be associated with “intel” as quite often host-state intelligence were/are intimately linked with the intelligence arm of its previous government; limited knowledge of risk management and contingency planning and the lack of global commonality of intelligence requirements /systems resulting in inconsistent advice to host capacity building.
Professional capability and conduct of commanders and technical experts/police advisers serving in missions.

Domestic policing demands and the recruitment processes for international peace-keeping missions do not necessarily allow for recruiting the most qualified and effective leaders or officers. Processes are intended to be merit-based; however, political considerations cannot be entirely disregarded and there is a need to respect geographical diversity and due regard to the larger and consistent resource contributing countries. In most instances Police Commanders have little or no engagement in the selection of their team and staff are regularly engaged on quick rotations and short-term secondments.

Despite improvements in selection processes, pre-deployment training and awareness, there is still a shortage of skilled and suitably experienced police leaders/officers being seconded to international peacekeeping missions. This results in significant gaps in provision of often key advisory roles. It is understandable given competing national security agendas that contributing countries do not always send their best staff, but it is regularly found that applicants do not have the necessary skillset and officers are being temporarily promoted into managerial posts within Missions, even though they have not previously served in these management roles nationally. Having the right person, in the right place at the right time is difficult to secure at a national level, but even more difficult in missions where forward planning and recruitment of staff can be inconsistent. UN mandates have a heavy emphasis on developing a democratic policing service, with strong protection of civilians, community policing and human rights elements. This is not consistent with some of the police contributing countries and therefore a recognisable skills gap. In a national context it may be possible to resource mutual aid or support from other areas but this is rare in an international context. The Standing Police Capacity in Brindisi goes some way to fill this gap but is itself under-resourced with the specialist skills now being demanded in complex Missions.18

Most officers deploying to peace operations do so in the form of individual secondments (UN – IPOs) or as part of a formed police unit (FPU). It is common within a Mission to have officers from several different countries serving within a police section or component. Each member is used to working with different organizational systems and processes and brings his/her national caveats, unique culture and own set of biases. Whilst this breadth of experience and knowledge can be a strength, it can also bring command and leadership challenges in terms of consistency, standards and loyalty. Recruitment and pre-deployment processes are being tightened; however, contributing countries do not all have the same human rights or disciplinary records, conduct standards or expectations. All of this leads to a greater need for skilled command and leaders within police components. Capabilities need to be higher than what is normally required in the regular national setting.

Despite the scale of some international operations, the ‘isolation of command’ is a term often heard in international police command circles. On a national level there are likely to be formal or informal relationships and support systems amongst senior leaders, many of whom have trained and worked together over a number of years. These relationships are built on shared values, trust and understanding and in the knowledge that if you need to task a colleague or request support that these will be carried out in a manner and to a standard acceptable to you. This is less likely to be the case in missions where there are continuous rotations in personnel and different experience, language and cultural norms.

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18 The UN Standing Police Capacity (SPC) was authorized by the General Assembly in September 2005 with 25 professional posts; reached initial operational capacity in October 2007; and had 36 professional posts as of 2012. Three posts (for training, police reform and investigations) were relocated from the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, to the Office of the Police Adviser in New York in 2014. UN General Assembly, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, …[P]roposed budget for the period from 1July 2014 to 30 June 2015 of the support account for peacekeeping operations, A/68/861, 2 May 2014, para. 64.
Historical lack of doctrine, personal development, joint and in-mission training

Police Commanders in a national context spend weeks, months and in some cases years, learning and developing their skills and capabilities. Whilst much of this prepares the foundation for international leadership and command roles they are provided little or no additional training before taking a senior command role in an international mission – yet it is repeatedly acknowledged that the demands and at times the political impact of this role is greater. The UN Senior Mission Leaders Courses, the AU Senior Mission Leaders Course, the EU Senior Mission Leaders programme and others aim to meet this gap in provision; however, selection and attendance does not yet fully correlate with Member State recruitment processes and much money and time is still being wasted. Moreover, many police commanders are being sent into theatre with little or no handover from their predecessor and have minimal understanding of the operating political context.

An additional hurdle is that many of the doctrinal fundamentals for international police peacekeeping at the operational and tactical level remain works in progress. Mandates from the UN Security Council are based on a good understanding of the host country security situation, and have ambitious objectives, but the responsible leaders and police experts in the missions do not yet have the right experience and tools at their disposal. Because of the mix of national, legal and professional policing traditions and experts, from up to 40 member states within one mission, engaged with the police of one host government, there is an obvious risk that in spite of the best intentions, UN (and EU) hyper-pluralism inadvertently undermines sound institution building.

Conclusion

The necessity to codify international police command has been discussed in many fora, but there has always been a reticence to identify and commit the key principles to policy. Fear of stepping on political freedoms, or perceived interference with the leadership of the SRSG or operational commanders has caused us to shy away from committing ‘pen to paper’. This fear is understandable, given the recognition of the necessity for flexibility and the requirement to develop bespoke solutions for local problems. Increasingly, however, there is a realization that an agreement on such principles would provide the opportunity to better enable nationally competent police commanders to undertake international command roles, identified by many to be the more challenging. It is being seen as an opportunity, through recognized command doctrine, training and exercise to build and strengthen resilience, professionalize resources and add much needed consistency to mandate delivery.

Police Commanders need the ability and resources to respond to the demands of dynamic crisis operations and the requests for capacity building and policing reforms. Few national post-holders face responding to these extremes with such limited support, staff and resource capabilities. Doctrine development, training and exercising would assist in bridging this gap. Additionally, the development of joint and standardized efforts to broaden the skillset within countries prepared to contribute high numbers of staff would widen the recruitment pool and better meet host country policing requirements.

The identification of common principles and guidelines should be seen as a tool for improving international police command – an enabler as opposed to a restrictor. It is unrealistic to consider that even the most experienced of police officers can continue to face what are increasingly challenging security and operating environments without such support.